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NOTES

PEEPING THROUGH THE CLOSET
KEYHOLE: SODOMY, HOMOSEXUALITY,
AND THE AMORPHOUS RIGHT OF
PRIVACY
JOHN V. HARRISON*

"Sex is the biggest nothing of all time."
-Painter, Andy Warhol1
INTRODUCTION
3
Laws proscribing sodomy 2 are laws against homosexuality.
From the time of Christ, social policy toward homosexuals 4 in

* J.D. Candidate, June 2001, St. John's University School of Law; B.A.,
Fordham University.
1 ERROL SELKIRK, SEX FOR BEGINNERS 14 (1988).

2 For the purposes of this Note, any reference to an act of sodomy, or a statute
proscribing acts of sodomy, assumes that the act in question was: (1)
noncommercial; (2) consensual; (3) carried out by consenting adults; and (4)
performed in the privacy of one's home. See Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 23-24
(Ga. 1998).
3 While it is true that many sodomy statutes allege to proscribe both
heterosexual and homosexual sodomy, "it is generally assumed either that these
laws, despite their wording, in fact apply only to homosexual sodomy, or that, if
applied to heterosexual sodomy, they would be unconstitutional." See RICHARD A.
POSNER, SEX AND REASON 291 (Harvard Univ. Press 1994). In addition, sodomy is a
more important practice to homosexual men than to heterosexuals because vaginal
intercourse is a substitute for sodomy that is available only to heterosexuals. Id.
4 The term "homosexual" first appeared in 1868 in correspondence between two
German sex reformers who, ironically, wished to change Germany's strict sex laws.
It entered the English lexicon in 1909 when it was listed in Merriam-Webster'sNew
International Dictionary as "morbid sexual passion for one of the same sex."
CHARLES PANATI, SEXY ORIGINS AND INTIMATE THINGS 190-91 (1998).
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Western culture has been strong disapproval, discrimination and
ostracism, often marked by the most severe of punishments. 5
While in many northern European countries the modern-day
plight of homosexuals is far better, the situation in Englishspeaking countries, especially the United States, is less
favorable.6 The existence of anti-sodomy legislation not only
impinges on the sexual freedom of heterosexuals, and virtually
eliminates freedom of sexual contact between homosexuals, but
also has a direct negative effect on society's attitude toward
homosexuals. 7 It may be true that today homosexuals enjoy
increased tolerance and greater influence in the political arena,
and some argue that this increased stature makes the argument
against anti-homosexual sodomy statutes moot.8
It would,
however, be naive to believe that these advances in the status of
homosexuals represent an end to blatant discrimination against
them. 9 At one point, all fifty states had laws proscribing acts of
5 See POSNER, supra note 3, at 291. Even in the United States, some sodomy
statutes carry maximum sentences of 10 to 20 years imprisonment. See ALA. CODE §
13A-6-63 (2000).
6 POSNER, supra note 3, at 291. The following countries and territories have no
sodomy laws, though some have laws forbidding homosexual conduct between
members of the military: Albania; Antigua and Barbuda; Argentina; Aruba; Austria;
Belgium.; Bolivia; Brazil; Bulgaria; Cambodia; Central African Republic; Chad;
Chile; China; Columbia; Congo; Costa Rica; Croatia; Cuba; Cyprus; Czech Republic;
Denmark; Dominican Republic; Dutch Antilles; Ecuador; Egypt; El Salvador;
Estonia; Finland; France; Germany; Gibraltar; Greece; Greenland; Guatemala;
Haiti; Honduras; Hong Kong; Hungary; Iceland; Indonesia; Iraq; Ireland; Israel;
Italy; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kosovo; Liberia; Lithuania; Luxembourg;
Madagascar; Martinique; Mexico; Monaco; Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway;
Panama; Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Portugal; Russia; Rwanda; Senegal; Serbia;
South Africa; South Korea; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Taiwan; Thailand; Turkey;
Ukraine; Uruguay; Venezuela; and Vietnam. The United States is part of the
following group of countries that currently have sodomy laws, some carrying a
penalty of death: Algeria; Angola; Armenia; Bangladesh; Barbados; Botswana;
Brunei; Burma; Burundi; Cameroon; Ethiopia; Fiji; Ghana; India (punishable by life
imprisonment); Iran (punishable by death); Jamaica; Kenya; Kuwait; Libya;
Macedonia; Malaysia; Morocco; Mozambique; Nambia; Nepal; Nicaragua; Pakistan;
Saudi Arabia (punishable by death); Singapore (punishable by life imprisonment);
Somalia; Sri Lanka; Sudan (punishable by death); Syria; Tanzania; Trinidad;
Tunisia; Uganda; United Arab Emirates; Yemen (punishable by death); Zaire;
Zambia; and Zimbabwe. See Homosexual Rights Around the World (visited Sept 1,
1999) <http://www.actwin.com/ eatonohio/gay/world.htm>.
7 For a full discussion of this negative effect see infra Section II.
8 See POSNER, supra note 3, at 291.
9 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1995) (declaring unconstitutional a 1992
amendment to the Colorado State Constitution forbidding the state, its agencies,
and political subdivisions from enacting, adopting, or enforcing any law whereby

20001

THE AMORPHOUS RIGHT OF PRIVACY

1089

consensual sodomy. Such laws have been repealed or struck
down in thirty-two states. 10 Highlighting the fact that sodomy
laws are largely laws against homosexuality," today five states
and Puerto Rico currently have laws that proscribe only same12
sex acts of sodomy.
The recent overturn of Georgia's sodomy law in Powell v.
State,13 marks an ironic turn of events that presents an
14
opportunity to revisit the Supreme Court's decision in Bowers
and survey judicial handling of challenges to state sodomy laws.
In addition, the Vermont Supreme Court's decision in Baker v.
State,15 allowing some form of same-sex "marriage," heightens
the irony and helps to highlight the importance of repealing the
country's remaining sodomy laws.
Part I of this Note will review the Supreme Court's position
with respect to the constitutionality of state sodomy laws by
The privacy and equal
discussing Bowers v. Hardwick.16
homosexual orientation, conduct, practices, or relationships would be the basis for
any person to have or claim any protected status or claim of discrimination); see also
Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 291, 301 (6th Cir. 1996)
(holding a ballot initiative approved by 62 percent of Cincinnati voters did not
disempower a group of citizens from attaining special protection at all levels of state
government, but instead merely removed municipally enacted special protection
from gays and lesbians). The ballot initiative stated:
The City of Cincinnati and its various Boards and Commissioiis may not
enact, adopt, enforce or administer any ordinance, regulation, rule or
policy which provides that homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation,
status, conduct, or relationship constitutes, entitles, or otherwise provides
a person with the basis to have any claim of minority or protected status,
quota preference or other preferential treatment.
Id. at 301. Another case illustrating the blatant discrimination against homosexuals
is Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, which found the Boy Scouts' policy of preventing
homosexuals from being members of the organization was constitutionally protected
by First Amendment freedom of association. See 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
10 See American Civil Liberties Union, Lesbian & Gay Rights (visited Aug. 19,
1999) <httpJ/www.aclu.orgissuesgay/sodomy.html>. Twenty-five states have
legislatively repealed their sodomy laws. The bulk of these repeals took place in the
1970s, largely in response to events that took place in that decade. See AM. CIV.
LIBERTIES UNION, LESBIAN & GAY RTS. AND AIDS/HIV 2000 at 42-44 (1999).
11 See POSNER, supra note 3.
12 These states are Arkansas; Kansas; Missouri; Oklahoma; and Texas. The
states that still have laws proscribing both heterosexual and homosexual sodomy
are: Alabama; Arizona; Florida; Idaho; Louisiana; Michigan; Massachusetts;
Minnesota; Mississippi; North Carolina; South Carolina; Utah; and Virginia.
13 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998).
14 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
15 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
16 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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protection issues raised in Bowers will be compared and
contrasted with Powell and other state court decisions that,
unlike Bowers, found state sodomy laws to be unconstitutional.
Part II will highlight the reasons why the repeal of sodomy laws
is essential despite a general feeling that they are rarely
enforced and therefore harmless. This Note will also attempt to
illustrate the enigmatic situation created by the conflict between
the Bowers holding with respect to homosexual sodomy, and the
Vermont Supreme Court's recent approval of an equivalent to
same-sex marriage. 17 Part III presents prevalent arguments for
maintaining sodomy laws and reveals the weaknesses inherent
in these arguments. Part IV makes the argument that the
current state of privacy jurisprudence is so indefinite that it is
impossible to decide the constitutionality of sodomy laws under
this doctrine with any degree of certainty.
Instead, equal
protection is the more appropriate analysis to apply when a
sodomy law is challenged.
Finally, Part V argues that
discrimination against homosexuals in the form of state sodomy
laws can only be overcome by designating homosexuals a suspect
class for the purpose of equal protection analysis.
I.
A.

BOWERS V. THE STATES

Bowers v. Hardwick

The Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick'8 is a
logical point to commence a discussion of judicial overturn of
state sodomy laws. Bowers, of course, did not overturn Georgia's
sodomy law. 19 Quite to the contrary, Bowers determined that
there is no constitutional right to engage in homosexual
sodomy. 20 The Bowers decision does, however, cogently present
many of the issues raised by courts that have considered the
17 See Baker, 744 A.2d at 867 (holding that same-sex couples are entitled to all
of the rights and benefits afforded heterosexual couples through marriage).
18 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
19The Supreme Court upheld the sodomy law after first determining there was
no fimdamental right to homosexual sodomy. See id. at 191. Georgia's sodomy law
passed a rational basis test because it is acceptable to pass laws "based on notions of
morality." Id. at 196.
20 There was no fimdamental right to homosexual sodomy, the Court reasoned,
because the history of sodomy as an outlawed and immoral act precludes it from
being a liberty "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." Id. at 192
(quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
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In addition, Bowers

21 Six years before the Supreme Court would consider the constitutionality of
state sodomy laws, the New York Court of Appeals performed an analysis of the
state's sodomy laws under the Federal Constitution. To date, New York is the only
state to judicially decide the constitutionality of its sodomy laws under the Federal
Constitution.
In People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980), the court declared the New
York law unconstitutional as a violation of the fundamental right to privacy and as
a violation of equal protection under the U.S. Constitution. Unlike other state
courts, the Onofre court did not consider the statute's validity under the state
constitution. The facts of Onofre are fundamentally similar to the facts in Bowers.
Onofre was convicted of violating section 130.38 of the New York Penal Law for
committing an act of sodomy with another male in the privacy of his home. See id.
at 938.
The New York Court of Appeals performed a searching review of U.S. Supreme
Court decisions in order to establish the source of the right of privacy. The court
concluded that the right of privacy stems from the First, Fourth, Ninth, and
Fourteenth Amendments, but that the Supreme Court had yet to define the "outer
limits" of the right of privacy. See id. at 938-39 (citing Carey v. Population Servs.
Inc., 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977)). The government, however, asserted that by
virtue of the Supreme Court's decisions, it was clear that the right of privacy
extended only to marital intimacy and procreative choice. See Onofre, 415 N.E.2d at
939; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding a statute that
makes it a criminal offense for a married couple to use contraceptives invalid as
invading their right of privacy, "a right older than the Bill of Rights") Id. at 486.
Another case, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), invalidated a Massachusetts
statute forbidding the sale or distribution of contraceptive devices to unmarried
persons. The state argued that the statute acted as a deterrent to fornication, a
health measure, or as simply a prohibition on contraception. The Court held that
the statute violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
the right to privacy granted by the Constitution, which "gives an individual,
married or single, [the right] to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child." Id. at 453. This was an effective prediction of the Supreme Court's
position on the matter. The Onofre court concluded, however, that in light of the
Supreme Court's prior holdings, there was no rational basis for declining to extend
the right of privacy to cover an individual's private consensual choice to engage in
what was once considered deviant conduct. In addition, the court observed that, not
only did private acts of consensual sodomy not injure anyone else, but also no
showing had been made that physical injury is a common or even occasional
consequence to the participants of such acts. See Onofre, 415 N.E.2d at 939.
Displaying greater wisdom than the Supreme Court would show when it
addressed the constitutionality of anti-sodomy laws, the New York court expressly
disclaimed any view on the theological, moral, or psychological aspects of the
controversy. Noting that various authorities in these disciplines can and do disagree
about the propriety of consensual sodomy, the court quite correctly concluded that
the government should not provide the apparatus for the enforcement of moral or
theological values. See id. The Onofre court instructed that the community is free to
counsel, persuade, teach, advise, and use other non-coercive means to convince
members of society to adopt a particular moral position, but the government was not
to act as enforcer and punisher in such matters. See id.
The dissenters in Onofre legitimately criticized the notion of a constitutional
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provides a logical contrasting background against which Powell
v. State,22 the Georgia case that overturned the very same
sodomy statute upheld by the Bowers court, can be analyzed.
Another reason for looking at Bowers first is because it
reveals what might arguably be considered an uncharacteristic
bias, and even animus, by the Supreme Court against
homosexuals. Therefore, Bowers not only highlights the legal
arguments that form the basis for judicial overturn of state
right of privacy for being an indefinite concept, but then went on to support the idea
that the government's police power includes the ability to regulate the moral
conduct of its citizens in order to maintain a decent society. See id. at 944 (Gabrielli,
J., Dissenting). Such a conclusion begs the questions: What is a decent society? Who
is the final arbiter of decency and morality? Claiming that the New York Penal
Code is already an expression of the society's view of decency and morality, the
dissent offered no answers to these questions and declined to name a single
provision of the code that stood for this proposition. Id.
The Onofre dissenters were quite accurate in foreshadowing the rationale that
the Supreme Court would use in Bowers. First, they declared that Eisenstadt did
not announce any fundamental sexual rights, but only stood for the narrower
proposition that the "right of an individual to decide 'whether to bear or beget a
child' cannot be limited to married adults." Onofre, 415 N.E.2d at 947 (Gabrielli, J.,
Dissenting) (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)). The dissenters also
correctly foretold the Bowers Court's reaction to the argument that Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), stood for the proposition that consensual sexual acts
in the privacy of one's home are beyond the reach of the government. See Onofre,
415 N.E.2d at 939 n.2.
The Onfore dissent supported its position much like the Bowers court would.
Alluding to lessons learned in the Lochner era, the period from 1905 to 1934 during
which the Court frequently substituted its judgment for that of Congress and state
legislatures on the wisdom of economic regulation, see WILLIAM B. LOCKHART ET
AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 228 (1996), the dissenters warned that the
courts cannot act as a sort of super-legislature, but needed to observe the tenets of
judicial restraint by exercising only minimal scrutiny of state legislation. See
Onofre, 415 N.E.2d at 938 (Gabrielli, J., Dissenting). In fact, the dissent declared
that the majority's decision amounted to an act of judicial legislation that created a
new fundamental right. See id. at 938. While the Onofre dissenters are correct in
the notion that judicial restraint should be a guiding principal of appellate courts, it
is equally true that the court should not shirk its responsibility of reviewing the
constitutionality of its legislation for fear of executive bullying.
Finally, the Onofre dissenters foretold the Bowers Court's reliance on the
"deeply rooted" test for what freedoms are covered by the right of privacy. They
attempted to support their position on the fatally flawed notion that since sodomy
has been historically prohibited, it is an activity that cannot be protected by the
Constitution. The dissenters stepped into the same trap as the Bowers majority, a
trap set by laws in the Nation's history that permitted slavery, prohibited
interracial marriage, and treated women as chattel. Nonetheless, the dissent
declared "western man has never been free to pursue his own choice of sexual
gratification," and therefore, they concluded, constitutional protection for acts of
consensual sodomy simply do not exist. Id.
22 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998).
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sodomy laws, but also provides a glimpse at the deep-seated
homophobia that has kept such laws on the books for such a long
time.
1.

Judicial Restraint or Bias?
The Supreme Court made its feelings about homosexuality
and sodomy known in the widely criticized case 23 of Bowers v.
Hardwick, in which it considered the constitutionality of a
Georgia statute24 prohibiting sodomy between both heterosexual
and homosexual couples. 25 The Court limited the scope of its
decision to just homosexual sodomy, and left the Georgia
statute's proscription of heterosexual sodomy for another day
because the case involved prohibited sexual activity between
homosexuals. One might assume that this narrowing of the
issue was merely an exercise of judicial restraint, but the
decision's lack of support for such narrowing may indicate that
the Court had other reasons for focusing solely on the issue of
homosexual sodomy.
Perhaps one of the reasons the Bowers decision is so highly
criticized is because the majority's apparent dislike of
homosexuals is only thinly veiled.26 The dissent addressed this
2 See, e.g., Anand Agneshwar, Ex-Justice Says He May Have Been Wrong, THE
NAT'L L.J., Nov. 5, 1990, at 3; Tracey Rich, Sexual OrientationDiscriminationin the
Wake of Bowers v. Hardwick, 22 GA. L. REV. 773, 787 (1988) (noting the Supreme

Court's oversight that sodomy statutes apply to heterosexuals); Yvonne L. Tharpes,
Bowers v. Hardwick and The Legitimization of Homophobia in America, 30 HOW.

L.J. 829 (1987); Mitchell Lloyd Pearl, Chipping Away at Bowers v. Hardwick:
Making the Best of an UnfortunateDecision, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 154 (1988) (finding it
troubling that the Supreme Court "blatant[ly] refuse[d] to extend constitutional
protection to homosexuals"); Donald A. Dripps, Bowers v. Hardwick and the Law of
Standing: Noncases Make Bad Law, 44 EMORY L.J. 1417, 1434 (1995) (proposing

that the only implication of Bowers is that the government may validly denounce
homosexuality); Mary C. Dunlap, Gay Men and Lesbians Down by Law in the 1990's
USA. The ContinuingToll of Bowers v. Hardwick, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV 1, 4-

5 (1994) (explaining that the hostile reaction of gay organizations around the
country was prompted by their view that the Supreme Court had shown its disdain
for homosexuals in the Bowers decision).
24 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984).

25 Acts of sodomy are not confined to gay men. While homosexuals may have no
choice but to engage in acts that are considered "unnatural" when they desire sexual
intimacy, many heterosexuals, who do have a choice, choose to do likewise. A survey
has indicated that a majority of Americans have engaged in some form of sodomy,
regardless of their sexual preference. See ROBERT T. MICHAEL ET AL., SEX IN

AMERICA 139-41 (1994).
26 See, e.g., Sodomy Ruling: Dark Day in Court for Homosexuals, U.S. NEWS &

WORLD REPORT, July 14, 1986, at 18 (stating that the ruling in Bowers "allows Big
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dislike head-on, stating that "[n]o matter how uncomfortable a
certain group may make the majority of this Court, we have held
public
intolerance
or animosity cannot
that '[i]nere
constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person's physical
liberty.' "27 Another example of this thinly-veiled dislike is
revealed in Justice Burger's concurrence. 28 Finding it necessary
to drive home the repugnance of homosexuality and sodomy,
Justice Burger noted that homosexuality was not only
condemned from the beginning of the Republic, but for
thousands of years before, inferring that all things condemned
29
by Judeo-Christian moral standards ought to be illegal.
Resorting to 19th Century rhetoric, Burger referred to sodomy as
"a heinous act 'the very mention of which is a disgrace to human
nature ... 30
Amidst its expression of disapproval of homosexual sodomy,
the Court took the stance that it was not passing on the wisdom
or desirability of laws proscribing consensual acts of sodomy.
Instead, the Court felt its role was to determine "whether the
Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon
homosexuals to engage in sodomy... ."31 Curiously, though, the
Court simultaneously felt the need to suddenly limit its role in
such matters by declining to extend the right of privacy any
further. It would not be cynical to observe that no such need
existed when faced with the heterosexual issues raised in
Eisenstadt v. Baird, Roe v. Wade, and Casey v. Population
Services International.32 The timing of such self-limitation is, to
say the least, suspect.
'.

2.

The Deep Roots of Privacy

In 1986, the Court granted certiorari in Bowers because the
circuits were in disagreement over the constitutionality of state
Brother to police the bedroom of millions," with the likely result that antihomosexual bias will only increase).
27 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 212 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(citing O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975)).
28 See Bowers 478 U.S. 3at 196-97.
29 See id.
30 Id. at 197 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *215).
31 Id. at 190.
32 See id. at 190-91. The Court stated that these cases, construing the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to confer a fundamental right to
decide whether or not to beget or bear a child had no resemblance to the "claimed
constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy... ." Id.
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sodomy statutes. Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit's holding was
in opposition to cases decided in the Ninth and D.C. Circuits that
upheld state sodomy statutes. 33 The Court announced that the
Eleventh Circuit had misread its privacy jurisprudence
developed in the line of cases from Griswold v. Connecticut to
Eisenstadt.34 Privacy, according to the Court, pertained only to
areas affecting child rearing, family relationships, procreation,
marriage, contraception, and abortion.35
What the Court
neglected to acknowledge was that all of these privacy rights had
a
common
denominator-sex:
specifically
heterosexual
intercourse. While the Court might feel better about defining
privacy rights in terms other than sex, it cannot ignore two
important inferences: (1) the right of privacy, as developed by the
Court, is fundamentally based on peoples' freedom in deciding
the details of their sex lives; and (2) the areas the Court purports
to protect with a right of privacy all involve some degree of
sexual freedom. It is legitimate to inquire whether "marriage,"
"family," and "procreation"3 6 are merely code words for
heterosexual sex. If so, the Court's claim that there is "[n]o
connection between family, marriage or procreation on the one
hand and homosexual activity on the other,"37 is dramatically
weakened when family, marriage, and procreation are reduced to
the less euphemistic, but more realistic, characterization of
heterosexual sex. Once reduced to this simple term, it is difficult
to deny that there is a connection between the freedoms
associated with heterosexual sexual practices and the freedoms
associated with homosexual sexual practices.
38
Because the right of privacy exists solely by judicial fiat,
the Court found it important to assert that it was not merely
imposing its own moral judgment about homosexual sodomy. 39
Though not textually present in the Constitution, privacy rights
are those "fundamental liberties that are implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty."40 Further flushing out the test for the
33 See Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Dronenburg v.

Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
34 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91.

35 See id.
36 Id. at 191.
37 Id.

38 See ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TowARDs GAMMoRAH 103 (1996).
39 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-92.
40 Id. at 191 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
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freedoms covered by the right of privacy, the Court turned to
Moore v. East Cleveland,41 where it established that the liberties
protected by the right to privacy are "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition."42 The Court uses this "deeply
rooted" test to disqualify homosexual sodomy from the ranks of
protected privacy rights. In a paper-thin argument, the Court
asserted that since sodomy has been a criminal offense since the
establishment of the original thirteen states, the practice of
homosexual sodomy could not be deeply rooted in the Nation's
history and tradition.43 The fallacy of this conclusion is arrived
at with little thought. What such a statement actually proves is
that animus towards, and bias against, homosexual sex are
deeply rooted in the national tradition. In an attempt to bolster
its "deeply rooted" argument, the Bowers court performed an
exhaustive analysis of the prevalence of sodomy laws at the time
of the original thirteen states, and at the time of the ratification
of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. 44 The Court, however,
ignores the fact that slavery laws, anti-miscegenation laws, and
laws protecting a host of discriminatory practices were also
45
deeply rooted in this Nation's history.
The truth is that homosexuality is pervasive in the Nation's
history. In fact, it is pervasive in world history.4 6 The fact that
the Court can point to a long history of laws aimed at
persecuting homosexuals by criminalizing their sex practices
actually proves the prevalence of homosexuality throughout the
Nation's history.
If homosexuality was not pervasive and
embedded in American society, there would be little need to pass
laws aimed at impeding practices associated with it. The Court
41 431 U.S. 494 (1977).

42 Id. at 503.
43 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-94.
44 See id.

45 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding a
military order excluding all persons of Japanese ancestry from the west coast); Buck

v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (holding a Virginia statute that provides for the sexual
sterilization of inmates of State supported institutions, found to be afflicted with a
hereditary form of insanity or imbecility, to be within the power of the State under
the Fourteenth Amendment); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that

enforced separation of the races is not akin to inequality); Pace v. Alabama, 106
U.S. 583 (1883) (upholding the imposition of special penalties on interracial
adultery or fornication).
46 For an indication of homosexuality's deep historical roots, see generally A. L.
ROwSE, HoMoSEXUALS IN HISTORY (1977) (naming historical figures who were
purportedly homosexual).
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conveniently ignored the fact that the condemnation of sodomy
between heterosexual couples, married or unmarried, is likewise
deeply rooted in the common law and religious tradition of this
country, while declining to extend this decision to those
practices. The absurdity of the Court's reasoning in this respect
becomes apparent when one considers the Nation's long history
of anti-miscegenation laws.47 This history is brought into sharp
focus by the trial court decision that formed the basis of Loving
v. Virginia.48 In 1959, a Virginia trial court declared that the
state's anti-miscegenation laws were constitutional because
"Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and
red, and he placed them on separate continents .... The fact
that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the
races to mix."49 Reading such a rationale today causes most to
shiver in disbelief, yet the Bowers decision is remarkably similar
in tenor,50 and will doubtless cause similar shivers when read by
generations to come. Another similarity between many antimiscegenation cases and Bowers is the government's reliance
on
traditional Judeo-Christian values in arguing for the absurd
result that Loving v. Commonwealth51 represents. What both
47 For example, section 20-54 of the Virginia Code provided:

Intermarriage prohibited; meaning of term 'white persons.'--It shall
hereafter be unlawful for any white person in this State to marry any save
a white person, or a person with no other admixture of blood than white
and American Indian. For the purpose of this chapter, the term 'white
person' shall apply only to such person as has no trace whatever of any
blood other than Caucasian; but persons who have one-sixteenth or less of
the blood of the American Indian and have no other non-Caucasic blood
shall be deemed to be white persons. All laws heretofore passed and now in
effect regarding the intermarriage of white and colored persons shall apply
to marriages prohibited by this chapter.
VA.CODE ANN. § 20-54 (1960 Repl.Vol.). See generally, Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749
(Va. 1955) (discussing the court's rationale for upholding Virginia's antimiscegenation laws and stating that more than half the states in the Union have
such laws).
48 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
49 Id. at 3. This argument is echoed in the dissents of many state decisions that
have overturned state sodomy laws.
50 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 211 n.5 (1986) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (citing the similarities between the Court's reliance on religious
justification and the historical existence of similar prohibitions as a basis for law,
yet noting that the Court still found that the "vital personal rights" essential to the
pursuit of happiness outweighed such justifications).
5' 147 S.E.2d 78 (Va. 1966) (upholding a trial court decision that Virginia's
anti-miscegenation laws are valid because God intended for the races to be
separate).
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Bowers and Loving seem to ignore is the established principle
that conformity with some religious doctrine 52 can never form
the sole rational basis necessary for legitimate secular
53
legislation.
3.

Stanley v. Georgia and the Classic Arguments Against the
Extension of Privacy Rights

The Bowers Court found it necessary to close a door that it
opened eighteen years earlier. In Stanley v. Georgia,54 the Court
announced that "if the First Amendment means anything, it
means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone
in his house, what books he may read or what films he may
watch." 55 Hardwick, and many others who would eventually
challenge the constitutionality of sodomy statutes, seized this
holding in an attempt to broaden the Court's concept of privacy.
The Court, however, declined to follow this logic and determined
56
that Stanley was "firmly grounded in the First Amendment." It
52 One of the biblical passages often cited in an effort to show the disdain of
homosexual sodomy is Genesis, book 19, when God sends two male angels to Sodom
to warn the inhabitants to mend their evil ways. The angels seek refuge in Lot's
house and a group of male residents of Sodom arrive and demand, "Where are the
men who came to you tonight? Bring them out to us that we may have [intimacies]
with them." Genesis 19:5 (New American Bible). Lot begs with the men, "Do not do
this wicked thing." Genesis 19:7. A few verses later, God rains sulphurous fire upon
the inhabitants of Sodom. Genesis 19:24. There is a certain irony, however, when
one considers that
Itihe Bible is replete with episodes in which the afflictions of the poor, the
blind, the lame, and the diseased were regarded with disdain. Persons who
occupied the status of slaves, illegitimate children, or women were objects
of unequal and unfair treatment. All of these biblical minorities were
stereotyped as sinful, evil, and social deviants marked for punishment.
Tharpes, supra note 23, at 835-36.
53 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 211; see also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
429-453 (1961) (examining the history of Sunday closing laws and upholding them
as constitutional based on secular reasoning despite the laws' religious origin);
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40 (1980) (stating "a statute must have a secular
legislative purpose... that neither advances nor inhibits religion") (quoting Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)).
54 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (holding that whatever the justifications for state
statutes regulating obscenity, they cannot reach into the privacy of one's own home).

55 Id.
56 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195. The dissent in People v. Onofre raised this argument
six years earlier, stating that Stanley merely proscribed "governmental interference
in making important, protected decisions." People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936, 939
(Gabrielli, J., Dissenting) (N.Y. 1980). Apparently, however, the Tennessee Court of
Appeals was not persuaded by the Bowers majority's interpretation of Stanley. In
overturning the state's same-sex sodomy law, the court cited Stanley in support of
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was in explaining away the Stanley holding that the Court
raised the arguments most relied on by those defending sodomy
laws. The Court reasoned that, if the argument in favor of
allowing private acts of consensual sodomy was that people
acting in the privacy of their own homes, and not injuring any
third party, ought to be left alone, then other types of currently
illegal conduct would also have to be permitted when carried out
in the privacy of a person's home. The conduct cited by the
Bowers court and echoed by anti-sodomy proponents since, was
drug use and incest. In fact, the dissenters in the Kentucky
Supreme Court decision overturning the state's same-sex sodomy
law5 7 used an almost identical argument predicting the fall of
drug and incest laws as well as laws prohibiting cruelty to
animals, the abuse of dead human bodies, suicide, and
polygamy. 58 The Bowers dissent aptly points out that Stanley is
as much based on the Fourth Amendment, as it is on the First
Amendment. 5 9 The entire concept of privacy is firmly rooted in
the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable search
and seizure and peoples' right to security within their homes. In
fact, the Fourth Amendment is the closest the Constitution
60
comes to containing a textual provision for the right of privacy.
As is discussed below, several state courts have used the Stanley
decision as a basis for expanding their privacy jurisprudence.
The dissent in Bowers offers a cogent response to the
majority's incest and drug use arguments. First, the dissenters
note that behaviors such as drug use and gun possession differ
dramatically from consensual acts of sodomy in that they are not
61
victimless because they are both inherently dangerous.
Second, the dissent points out the randomness in the majority's
decision to group acts of homosexual sodomy with acts of incest
and adultery, rather than with acts of heterosexual sex, or with

the proposition that the sanctity of the home was essential to the right of privacy.
See Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250, 262 n.10 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).
57 See Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
58 See id. at 505.
59 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 207-08 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
60 See id. at 208. Indeed, as the Court revealed in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965), the Constitutional right of privacy has its underpinnings in several
of the first ten Amendments. The Fourth and Fifth Amendments were singled out
as granting "protection against all governmental invasions 'of the sanctity of a
man's home and the privacies of life.' "Id. at 484.
61 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 208-09.
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sodomy between married persons. 62 The comparison of acts of
private, consensual sodomy to incest is a classic apples and
oranges comparison.
Incest presents a situation in which,
because of the uniquely close relationship of the parties involved,
true consent is impossible. Adultery presents a situation in
which third parties such as spouses and children are victims
subject to genuine injury.
With the refusal to include homosexual sodomy in the
protections afforded by the right of privacy, the Georgia sodomy
statute was found not to impinge on a fundamental right. The
Court, therefore, needed only to apply rational basis review.
With little discussion, the Court declared that passing a law on
the basis of majoritarian morality was enough to qualify as a
legitimate state interest, and glibly noted that "if all laws
representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated
under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy
63
indeed."
4.

A Wavering Majority and a Strong Dissent

Filing a brief concurrence, Justice Powell agreed with the
majority in terms of its stance on limiting the right of privacy to
exclude homosexual sodomy. Justice Powell, however, hinted
that he was not entirely comfortable with the decision by
conceding that Hardwick may have been protected from the
wrath of Georgia's sodomy statute by the Eighth Amendment's
bar against cruel and unusual punishment. 64 Justice Powell
himself later confirmed the hint. Four years after the decision,
the then retired Justice admitted he "probably made a mistake"
in providing the crucial swing vote in the Bowers case. 65 Justice
Powell, like most of Bowers' critics, ultimately believed the
decision to be inconsistent with Roe v. Wade66 and concluded that
"the dissent[ers] had the better of the arguments." 67
Justice Powell was right. The dissent's cogent arguments
have influenced many of the state court decisions overturning
state sodomy statutes. Unlike the majority's odd interpretation
62 See id. at 209 n.4.

63 Id. at 196.
6

See id. at 197-98 (Powell, J., concurring).

65 See Agneshwar, supra note 23, at 3.

66 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

6 See Agneshwar, supra note 23, at 3.
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of the issue as to whether there was a constitutional right to
engage in homosexual sodomy, 68 the dissenters realized the case
was actually about "the right most valued by civilized men...
69
the right to be left alone."
At the core of the dissent was an attack on the majority's
questionable logic: if sodomy and homosexuality have been the
subject of prohibition throughout history, then current
prohibitions must be constitutional. Quoting Justice Holmes,
the dissent thought it "revolting to have no better reason for a
rule of law than... [one that] was laid down in the time of
Henry IV."70 The dissenters realized that protecting the freedom
of people who challenge majoritarian notions of morality is a
difficult and unpopular task for a court, but "[f]reedom to differ
is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be
a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right
71
to differ as to things that touch the heart of existing order."
In disassembling perhaps the weakest part of the majority's
reasoning, the dissent attacked the notion that laws based on the
majority's notion of morality are implicitly constitutional.
Quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder,72 the dissent summed up the
principle which should drive such judicial inquiries into matters
of private sexuality: "[a] way of life that is odd or even erratic but
interferes with no rights or interests of others is not to be
condemned because it is different." 73
B.

Powell and the States
74
Seven states have judicially overturned their sodomy laws.
68 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.

69 Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 478 (1928)).
70 Id. (quoting Justice Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469

(1897)).
71 Id. at 211 (quoting West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943)).
72 406 U.S. 205, 224 (1972).
73 Id.
74 See Commonwealth v. Bonado, 415 A.2d 47 (Pa. 1980) (overturning

Pennsylvania's sodomy statute); see also People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y.
1980) (overturning New York's sodomy statute); Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842
S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992) (overturning Kentucky's sodomy statute); Campbell v.

Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (overturning Tennessee's sodomy
statute); Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997) (overturning Montana's
sodomy statute); Williams v. State, 722 A.2d 886 (Ga. 1998) (refusing to enforce
Maryland's sodomy statute and resulting in a consent decree in which the state
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With the exception of New York, all have done so under their
state's constitution. Two states, Pennsylvania and New York,
overturned their sodomy statutes prior to the 1986 Bowers
decision. All of the states, in one way or another, wrestled with
the expanding and contracting character of the right of privacy,
often using the Supreme Court's privacy jurisprudence as a
guide, but finding a more expansive right of privacy under their
own state's constitution. Only two states, Pennsylvania and
Kentucky, substantially addressed the equal protection issues
raised by a challenge to a sodomy statute.
76
Because Powell v. State75 is one of the more recent cases
marking the overturn of a state sodomy statute, and because the
statute in question is the same one considered by the Bowers
court, it is a case that helps define what may be changing legal
and social attitudes with respect to laws against sodomy.
Likewise, Commonwealth v. Wasson,77 the decision overturning
Kentucky's sodomy law, is particularly instructive because it too
is a post-Bowers decision. Unlike other state courts weighing the
constitutionality of their sodomy laws, Wasson overruled the
Kentucky statute on both privacy and equal protection grounds.
These two cases, Powell and Wasson, are illustrative of the statelevel judicial trend toward overturning state sodomy laws.
These cases warrant attention for the purpose of contrasting the
position taken by the Supreme Court in Bowers with, what
appears to be a more liberal attitude toward sodomy, privacy,
and equal protection taken by the states.
When contrasted with the facts of Bowers v. Hardwick,78 the
agreed to repeal two sodomy laws in order to settle a law suit filed by the ACLU);
Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998) (overturning Georgia's sodomy statute).
75 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998).
76 Maryland's two sodomy laws were overturned in January 1999, two months
after the Powell decision. This overturn came, however, in the form of a consent
decree eliminating both sodomy laws. A Baltimore County Circuit Court ruling in
favor of an ACLU challenge to the state's sodomy laws prompted the consent decree.
See AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, LESBIAN & GAY RTS. AND AIDS/HIV 2000 at 22, 40
(1999).
77 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
78 478 U.S. 186 (1986). There is much lore about how exactly a police officer
found himself in the bedroom of Michael Hardwick so that he could arrest and
charge him with violation of the state's sodomy statute, and thus creating the basis
for the case. The fill story not only fills in the gaps in the Court's version of the
facts, but also highlights some of the harassment to which homosexuals are subject.
Hardwick was engaged in an act of oral sex with another man in his bedroom at
about 3 a.m. An Atlanta police officer seeking to serve a warrant on Hardwick, was
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facts of Powell are particularly ironic. While Bowers involved
the private consensual sexual activity of a homosexual couple,
Powell involved an act of questionably consensual, adulterous,
79
oral sex between a man and his wife's seventeen-year-old niece.
As a result of this act, Powell was convicted of violating
Georgia's infamous sodomy statute and received a five-year
sentence.80
Early in its opinion, the Georgia Supreme Court dismissed
Bowers as inapplicable to Powell because the court was
reviewing the state's sodomy statute under the state
constitution, and recognized that the Georgia Constitution
grants more extensive rights in the area of privacy than the
Federal Constitution.8 ' Indeed, the court identified historically
broader protections under the state constitution in the areas of
free speech, self-incrimination, cruel and unusual punishment,
free education, and equal protection.8 2 The court proceeded to
trace, what it referred to as, the right of privacy's "long and
83
distinguished history in Georgia."
allowed into the apartment by a friend of Hardwick's who was visiting at the time.
The police officer entered Hardwick's bedroom, witnessed the act, and arrested both
Hardwick and his partner. While Hardwick was never prosecuted, the story of his
arrest helps explain why homosexuals fear that sodomy laws are one of the tools
that police may use to harass them. It is reasonable to argue that the service of a
warrant for failing to appear for a low-level misdemeanor at three o'clock in the
morning is the sort of vigilant policing that is reserved for use against homosexuals.
What was the warrant for? A police officer had observed Hardwick exit a gay bar
with an open beer can and he was charged with violating Georgia's open container
law. Hardwick apparently never paid the fine. See Ann Woolner, Though Seldom
Enforced, Sex Statute Meant A Lot, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REPORT, Nov. 30, 1998
at 1.
79 See June D. Bell, Conviction for Sodomy Draws 5 Years, Vow to Appeal,
FULTON COUNTY DAILY REPORTER, Oct. 16, 1997, at 3.
80 See id.
81 See Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 21-22 (Ga. 1998).
82 See id. at 22 n.3.
83 Id. at 21. In fact, it was a Georgia case that marked the first time the right of
privacy was ever recognized by any court of last resort in the country. See Pavesich
v. New England Life Ins., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). In Pavesich, the Georgia court
found the right of privacy to be an immutable and absolute right stemming from
natural law, and endorsed a person's "right to be let alone," so long as he was not
interfering with the rights of others. See id. at 70-71. More than seventy years
later, Georgia would recognize "the right to define one's circle of intimacy." MaconBibb County Water & Sewerage Auth. v. Reynolds, 299 S.E.2d 594, 596 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1983).
In sharp contrast to the "long and distinguished" history of privacy that Georgia
and other states could look to in overturning their sodomy statutes, Tennessee's
privacy jurisprudence was in its infancy. The Court of Appeals of Tennessee
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Two years earlier, in Christensen v. State,84 the Georgia
85
Supreme Court upheld a challenge to the state's sodomy law.
In Powell, the court found it necessary to abandon the rational
basis review applied in Chistensen and adopt a strict scrutiny
analysis by focusing on the right of privacy's classification as a
fundamental right.8 6 It did so by examining the valid bounds of
the state's police power, and by questioning the premise that
majoritarian morality is a compelling government interest.
Like the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had done eighteen

overturned the state's "Homosexual Acts" Statute in 1996 in Campbell v. Sundquist,
926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). Unlike other states that were able to draw on
a rich history of privacy jurisprudence, the Tennessee Supreme Court had first
articulated such a right only four years earlier in Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588
(Tenn. 1992). Like the government of Kentucky in the Wasson case, the government
in Campbell argued that the right of privacy encompassed by the Tennessee
Constitution was identical in breadth to that of the Federal Constitution. Therefore,
the government contended, because the federal right of privacy does not encompass
homosexual sodomy, neither should Tennessee's right of privacy. Observing that in
defining the right of privacy under the Tennessee Constitution, the court is not
bound by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Bowers, the Tennessee
Supreme Court was correct in allowing greater protections under the state
constitution than those granted under the Federal Constitution. Like the Federal
Constitution, the right of privacy is not expressly provided for in the Tennessee
Constitution. The Tennessee Court of Appeals, however, did not limit its
interpretation of the right of privacy to the Tennessee Constitution's Due Process
Clause. See TENN. CONST. art. I, § 8. Instead, the court found that the right of
privacy was reflected in several sections of the Tennessee Declaration of Rights. See
Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d at 260. Section three guarantees freedom of worship, section
seven protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, section 19 guarantees
freedom of speech, and section 27 protects against the quartering of soldiers. See
TENN. CONST. Interpreting the extent of the Tennessee Constitution's right of
privacy to be far greater than that provided by the Federal Constitution, the Court
of Appeals determined that private, consensual, noncommercial acts of sex are
matters of "intimate personal concern... at the heart of Tennessee's ... right to
privacy." Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d at 262. Furthermore, the court declared the extent
of this right should not be diminished for the mere fact that the adults engaging in
this activity are of the same gender. See id. The court determined that because the
right of privacy is a fundamental right, strict scrutiny analysis had to be applied to
the matter of its constitutionality under the state constitution. See id. Because of
the court's holding on the issue of privacy, there was no need for it to address the
equal protection issues raised by the courts below.
84 468 S.E.2d 188 (Ga. 1996).
85 See id. at 190.
86 Christensen held that a statutory proscription against sodomy is a legitimate
and valid exercise of state police power in furtherance of the moral welfare of the
public. The court held that the Georgia Constitution does not deny the legislature
the right to prohibit such conduct; thus, a statute criminalizing sodomy does not
violate the right to privacy under the Georgia Constitution. See id.
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years earlier in Commonwealth v. Bonadio,8 7 the Georgia court

87 415 A.2d 47 (Pa. 1980). Pennsylvania was the first state to have its sodomy
laws declared unconstitutional. Predating the Bowers decision, the court in Bonadio
focused on the valid bounds of police power and touched upon the issue of sexual
liberty without specifically addressing the right of privacy. See id. at 49. Unlike
Bowers, where the act occurred in the privacy of a bedroom, the act of sodomy at
issue in Bonadio occurred in an "adult" movie theater. Because the circumstances of
the charged acts were anything but private, the court avoided the question of
privacy and focused on whether Pennsylvania's sodomy statute constituted a valid
exercise of police power, and whether the statute constituted an equal protection
violation. The Bonadio court relied heavily on the American Law Institute's position
on such matters, as presented in the Institute's comments to the Model Penal Code.
See id. at 50. This reliance would be adopted by other states in overturning their
sodomy statutes. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5 (comment) (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1955). A comment to the code states: "No harm to the secular interests of the
community is involved in atypical sex practice in private between consenting adult
partners." Id. In addition, the Code suggests that the decisive factor favoring
decriminalization of laws against private homosexual relations between consenting
adults is the importance that society and law ought to give to individual freedom of
choice and action in matters of private morality. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND
COMMENTARIES, PART II 362-63 (1980).
The court found that the proper exercise of police power involved protecting an
individual's right to be free from interference in observing his own morality, but did
not involve enforcing the majority's morality on a person whose conduct, though
contrary to the majority, did not harm others. See Bonadio, 415 A.2d at 50. Indeed,
"what is considered to be 'moral' changes with the times and is dependent upon
societal background." Id. at 50. The court did acknowledge that there is a place for
morality in society, but "[sipiritual leadership, not the government, has the
responsibility for striving to improve the morality of individuals." Id.
While the Bonadio court avoided an examination of the privacy issue, it
explored the foundations of liberty and freedom. The court contributed to the
philosophical underpinnings of the right of privacy, as they relate to consensual
sodomy, in its reliance on the seminal work of philosopher John Stuart Mill in On
Liberty. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859). Mill espoused the belief that
the basic concepts of liberty and freedom prohibited laws restricting the private,
consensual sexual behavior of a nation's citizens. Mill's belief was that a
government may only legitimately exercise its power over an individual, against his
will, in order to prevent harm to others, and that protecting an individual's own
physical or moral well-being is not within the realm of legitimate state power. Mill
believed society should attempt to persuade and reason with a person for his own
good, but it should never be able to compel or punish him. See id.
According to Mill, human liberty has three components: (1) liberty of conscience,
allowing the individual absolute freedom in terms of opinion, thought, and feeling;
(2) liberty of tastes and pursuits, allowing a person to plan his own life to suit his
character so long as he doesn't hurt others; and (3) freedom to unite, allowing
individuals to come together with other individuals for whatever purpose they
desire, providing they do not hurt others and the unity is consensual. See id. at 5051. By introducing Mill's philosophy as fundamental to the freedoms associated with
the right to engage in certain consensual sexual activities, the Bonadio court
provided a philosophical framework in which other courts could define the right of
privacy as it relates to sodomy.
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concluded that legislation must serve a public purpose, and the
means adopted to achieve that purpose must be reasonable and
not unduly oppressive.8 8 In applying this test to determine the
validity of the police power created by the Georgia anti-sodomy
statute, the court concluded that a statute with the sole effect of
regulating private conduct carries no public purpose.8 9
Furthermore, the Powell court urged that the invasion of the
right of privacy made possible by Georgia's anti-sodomy statute
was both unreasonable and unduly oppressive. 90 Accordingly,
the court found that the statute "exceeds the permissible bounds
of the police power."91
Citing the Montana Supreme Court's decision in Gryczan v.
State,92 the Georgia Supreme Court declared that the mere fact
88 See Powell, 510 S.E.2d at 25.
89 See id.
90 See id.

91 Id.
92 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997). The Supreme Court of Montana overturned the
state's same-sex sodomy statute in 1997. Montana's statute, MONT. CODE ANN. § 455-505 (1999), was broader than most other sodomy statutes in that it prohibited
"any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of the person of another.. . in
order to knowingly or purposely arouse or gratify the sexual response or desire of
either party." MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(66)(b). There seems to have been
considerable pressure to remove this law from the books as there were legislative
attempts to repeal the statute in 1991, 1993, and 1995. See Gryczan, 942 P.2d at
116. Because the court could have easily dismissed the case for lack of standing, it is
obvious that the constitutionality of the state's same-sex sodomy statute was an
issue the court wanted to address. See id. at 117-20. The court may have alluded to
one of the factors that drew its interest to this case, and a cause of the attempts to
repeal the law, in referring to evidence indicating there is a correlation between
homosexual sodomy laws and homophobic violence, making gays the most frequent
victims of hate crimes in America today. See id. at 120.
The court analyzed the constitutionality of the statute with respect to the right
of privacy under the state constitution and identified the right to be let alone as one
of the basic tenets of Montana's right of privacy. See id. at 121; see also Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Unlike the Federal Constitution and many state
constitutions, the Montana Constitution expressly grants a fundamental right of
privacy and alludes to the need for strict scrutiny analysis should the right be
violated. Montana's Constitution states: "Right of Privacy. The right of individual
privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed
without the showing of a compelling state interest." MONT. CONST. art. H, § 10. The
Gryczan court reasoned that all adults have an expectation of privacy with regard to
their consensual sexual activities, and that this expectation precluded governmental
snooping. See Gryczan, 942 P.2d at 122.
In addition to public health issues advanced by the government, the state also
attempted to advance public morality as a compelling governmental interest. The
court stated that, just because the legislature enacted a law that happens to be the
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that legislation reflects the moral choice of the majority does not
require the court to simply acquiesce. 93 Quoting Oliver Wendel
Holmes' dissent in Lochner v. New York, 94 the Powell court noted
that finding a particular opinion natural and familiar or novel
and shocking should not pre-conclude the propriety of a
legislative act.95 This is a sentiment echoed by United States
Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black more than sixty years after
the Lochner decision. Justice Black said that it is a popular
misconception that "the Constitution prohibits that which [the
majority] thinks should be prohibited and permits that which
they think should be permitted."9 6 Though it rejected the notion
that majoritarian morality ought to drive its decision, the Powell
court found it necessary to distance itself personally from the
decision it was rendering, stating that "if we were called to pass
upon the propriety of [acts of sodomy], we would not condone
[them] .,,7
The Powell dissent adopted many of the arguments of the
Bowers majority, including the now familiar argument that an
expansion of the right of privacy will inevitably lead to the
legalization of drug use in one's home.9 8 The dissent in Powell
argued that the majority placed too much in a right of privacy
not expressly articulated in the state's constitution, and accused
them of acting as social engineers rather than jurists. 99 The
dissent also made the equally standard argument that under the
moral choice of the majority, it would not merely acquiesce to majoritarian morality
without evidence of some other legitimate state interest. Instead, the court declared
that the Montana Constitution does not protect morality, but it does guarantee
privacy to all persons, whether they are in the majority or the minority. See id. at
125. Citing James Madison, the Gryczan court declared that it was as important to
protect the minority against injustice at the hands of the majority, as it was to
protect society against oppression by its rulers. See id. (citing THE FEDERALIST, No.
51, at 351 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)). In fact, the court reasoned
that certain rights are so fundamental that they cannot be denied to a minority "no
matter how despised by society." Gryczan, 942 P.2d at 126.
93 See Powell, 510 S.E.2d at 25 (citing Gryczan, 942 P.2d at 125).
94 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905).
95 See Powell, 510 S.E.2d at 26 n.6.
96 Newsmakers, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 9, 1968, at 52.
97 Powell, 510 S.E.2d at 25.
98 See id. at 30 (ITihe constitutionality of criminal laws which forbid the
possession and use of certain drugs has suddenly become questionable.").

99 See id. at 28 ("[T]he only perceptible unconstitutionality in this case is that
which is evidenced by the majority's determination, acting as social engineers
rather than as jurists, to elevate their notion of individual 'liberty' over the
collective wisdom of the people's elected representatives. . . .") (citations omitted).
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majority's reasoning, acts of incest, when committed by
consenting adults, should likewise be protected by the right of
privacy. 10 0 The dissenters ascribed the difference in how sodomy
and incest were treated by the majority to the political
correctness of improving the status of homosexuals. Finally, the
dissent pointed out an anomaly created by the overturn of the
state's sodomy law; while it remains a crime for a father to
engage in intercourse with his adult stepdaughter, they may now
lawfully perform acts of sodomy. 1°1 The Powell majority was not
persuaded by these arguments.
Six years prior to the Powell decision, the Supreme Court of
Kentucky affirmed two lower court decisions overturning a
Kentucky statute prohibiting same-sex sodomy. 10 2 The trial
court dismissed criminal charges brought under the statute as
violative of an individual's right of privacy under the state
constitution. 10 3 An intermediate appellate court affirmed the
trial court and added to the analysis a finding that the statute
10 4
also violated the state constitution's Equal Protection Clause.
In affirming the decisions of the lower courts, the Kentucky
Supreme Court affirmed and adopted both the right of privacy
and equal protection rationales, and limited its analysis solely to
state constitutional grounds.
The facts of Commonwealth v. Wasson'0 5 illustrate how
homosexuals are singled-out for enforcement of sodomy laws.
Police conducted an undercover operation in which officers
wearing microphones staked out a parking lot and attempted to
engage passersby in conversation. The objective was to see if
any individuals passing by would solicit one of the officers for
sexual contact. 10 6 One of the officers struck up a conversation
100 See id. at 30.
101 See id.
102
103

See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.100 (Michie 1999).
See Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 488 (Ky. 1993).

104 See id. at 489. Sections two and three of the Kentucky Constitution provide:
"Absolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and property of freemen exists
nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest majority .... All men, when they form
a social compact, are equal... ." KY. CONST. § 2-3.
105 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1993).
106Wasson was actually charged with a violation of KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
506.030, which prohibits solicitation to commit any criminal offense. In this case the
criminal offense was sodomy. Therefore, a finding that the sodomy law was
unconstitutional undermined the solicitation offense. See Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at
488.
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with Wasson that lasted approximately twenty-five minutes. At
the end of the conversation, Wasson invited the officer to "come
home" with him. The officer then prodded Wasson for details,
and Wasson finally expressed a desire to engage in acts
prohibited by the Kentucky sodomy statute. 1 7 No money was
offered and there was no suggestion that the sexual activity
08
would occur anywhere but in the privacy of Wasson's home.
While the defense presented seven expert witnesses offering
testimony on the sociological, psychological, and medical aspects
of same-sex sexual activity, the government presented no
witnesses and offered no scientific or social science data. 109
Instead, the government relied on the familiar position that the
majority, speaking through the legislature, has the right to
criminalize any sexual behavior it deems immoral. 110 Arguing
that the Kentucky constitution gives no greater right to privacy
than the Federal Constitution, the government took the position
that the court was bound by the decision of the Supreme Court
in Bowers."' The Kentucky Supreme Court refused to accept the
government's argument that the Kentucky constitution
paralleled the U.S. Constitution with regard to the right to
engage in consensual acts of same-sex sodomy. In fact, the court
made the point that "[t]he adoption of the Federal Constitution
in 1791 was preceded by state constitutions... [and] state
constitutional law documents and the writings on liberty were
112
more the source of federal law than the child of federal law."
Just as the Supreme Court of Georgia would do in Powell five
years later, the Kentucky court pointed to its rich history of
privacy jurisprudence that predated the United States Supreme
Court's discovery of a right of privacy in the Federal
113
Constitution.
See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.100 (Michie 1999).
108 See Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 489.
109 See id. at 490.
110 See id.
107

111 See id.
112

Id. at 492.

113

See id. at 492-93. In Commonwealth v. Campbell, 117 S.W. 383 (Ky. 1909),

the Kentucky Supreme Court laid the foundation for the right of privacy that would
be used eighty-three years later by the Wasson court in overturning Kentucky's
same-sex sodomy statute. In a succinct and deliberate discourse on a citizen's right
to privacy, the Campbell court announced:
Man in his natural state has a right to do whatever he chooses and has the
power to do. When he becomes a member of organized society.., he
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The government also attempted to make the argument made
in Bowers that since homosexual sodomy was outlawed at
common law and by statute since 1860, its prohibition is deeply
rooted in the laws of the state. The Kentucky Supreme Court
however, correctly pointed out that while acts of anal sex may
have been traditionally prohibited, the Kentucky statute at issue
also banned acts of same-sex oral copulation and any form of
deviate sexual intercourse between women.
While these
activities may have been historically viewed as immoral, they
were never punished as criminal in Kentucky. 1 4 Accordingly,
the Wasson majority rejected the argument that the
proscriptions are historical, and therefore valid. As a result, the
Kentucky Supreme Court declined to apply the United States
Supreme Court's analysis of whether the liberties at issue were
deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition. 1 5 Indeed,
the Wasson court held that the purpose of the Due Process
Clause of the Kentucky Constitution was not to protect
traditional values, but to question them when they operated to
discriminate against disadvantaged minorities. 116 The court
illuminated one of the fundamental flaws in the Bowers Court's
"deeply rooted" analysis when it said: "[Iun all probability,
homosexuality is not considered a deeply rooted part of our
traditions precisely because homosexuals have historically been
1 7
subjected to invidious discrimination."
The Wasson court declined to speculate as to whether
surrenders, of necessity, all of his natural right the exercise of which is, or
may be, injurious to his fellow citizens. This is the price that he pays for
governmental protection, but it is not within the competency of a free
government to invade the sanctity of the absolute rights of the citizen any
further than the direct protection of society requires .... Let a man
therefore be ever so abandoned in his principles,or vicious in his practice,
provided he keeps his wickedness to himself, and does not offend against
the rules of public decency, he is out of the reach of human laws.
Id. at 385-86 (emphasis added). The Campbell case was about a person's right to
possess and consume alcohol in the privacy of his home. At the time it was decided,
prohibition and the consumption of alcohol was every bit as incendiary of a moral
issue as sodomy between consenting adults is today. See Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 495.
The Kentucky Supreme Court took a similar stance in Hershberg v. City of
Barbourville, 133 S.W. 985 (Ky. 1911), declaring an ordinance that made it illegal to
smoke cigarettes in the privacy of one's home, beyond the reach of state action
under the Kentucky Constitution.
114 See Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 491.
115 See id. at 499.
116
117

See id.
Id. at 499.
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homosexuals ought to be treated as a suspect class under the
Federal Constitution. The court, however, did hold homosexuals
to be an identifiable class under the Kentucky constitution
because the Kentucky Equal Protection Clause provides that no
class of people may be discriminated against. The government
argued that the level of moral indignation felt by the majority
with regard to homosexual sodomy provided the requisite
rational basis to treat homosexuals differently. In rejecting the
government's rational basis argument, the court found that it
was arbitrary to criminalize sexual behavior solely on the basis
8
of majoritarian sexual preference."
Taking a lead from Pennsylvania," 9 the Wasson court
supported its reasoning on the writings of the 19th century
The
English philosopher and economist John Stuart Mill.
Kentucky Supreme Court echoed Mill's philosophy when it
stated simply: "The majority has no moral right to dictate how
everyone else should live." 20 The court tempered this bold
position, and modified the Mill philosophy, by conceding that the
law is permitted to intervene for the purpose of stopping the selfinflicted harm that would result from drug use, or the failure to
use seat belts or crash helmets. The court endorsed this type of
intervention, not for the purpose of enforcing majoritarian
morality, "but because the victim of such self-inflicted harm
12 1
becomes a burden on society."
II. WHAT'S ALL THE Fuss: WHY SODOMY LAWS MUST BE
REPEALED
A common reaction to attempts to repeal sodomy statutes is:
"What's all the fuss?" After all, the nightly news is not filled
with accounts of "sex-police" bursting into bedrooms and
arresting people engaged in consensual acts of sodomy. 122 While
this may be true, the mere existence of such laws threatens
homosexuals' ability to go unharassed, increases the chances
that they will be the subject of violence and discrimination,

118 See id. at 500.

119 See Bonadio, 415 A.2d at 50-51; see also supra note 87 and accompanying
text.
120 Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 496.
121 Id.
at 497 (citing LORD LLOYD OF HAMPTSTEAD, INTRODUCTION TO
JURISPRUDENCE 59 (4th ed. 1979)).
122 See supranote 78.
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allows homosexuals to be routinely branded as "criminals" with
all of the concomitant stigma and disadvantages associated with
such a classification, and illustrates societal intolerance that
12 3
should not exist.
The recent decision by the Vermont Supreme Court, Baker v.
State,124 creates an even more urgent need to uniformly overturn
state sodomy laws. Baker clears the way for gay civil unions in
the state of Vermont. 125 While the complicated and debatable
questions about recognition of these unions by other states under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause are beyond the scope of this
Note, it is easy to predict the chaos that will arise when those
gay men who enjoy the absolute legal equivalent of marriage
cross the border into a state that has a sodomy law in effect.
Suddenly, homosexuals are apparently entitled to the protection
of marital privacy first extended in Griswold v. Connecticut.126
No doubt, the battle over the cross-border recognition of these
marriages will be fierce, but one thing is certain-under the
current Supreme Court precedents, the equivalent of gay
marriage and sodomy laws cannot co-exist.
In a way, the existence of dormant and unenforced sodomy
laws may give the public a sort of moral peace-of-mind. The
notion being that a state will tolerate homosexuals, so long as it
is on record that the state does not condone what they do in bed.
In another sense, it may be a way for society to deal with the
123 See AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, LESBIAN & GAY RTS. AND AIDS/HIV 2000 at
10 (1999). One of the chief areas in which sodomy laws and the stigma they cause
are used against homosexuals is in the area of child custody. "[Sodomy laws] are
used as a justification for separating lesbians and gay men from their children, or,
in the most recent fashion, for visitation and custody orders that force lesbians and
gay men to choose between their partners and their kids." Id.
12 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
125 Faced with a challenge to the state's denial of a marriage license to a samesex couple, the Baker court held:
[V]iewed in the light of history, logic, and experience, we conclude that
none of the interests asserted by the State provides a reasonable and just
basis for the continued exclusion of same-sex couples from the benefits
incident to a civil marriage license under Vermont law .... [WMe find a
constitutional obligation to extend to plaintiffs the common benefit,
protection, and security that Vermont law provides opposite-sex married
couples.
Id. at 886. The court, however, stopped short of requiring the issuance of marriage
licenses to same-sex couples. Instead, the court left it to the "Legislature to craft an
appropriate means of addressing this constitutional mandate ... ." Id
126 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding the state cannot outlaw certain intimate sexual
activities because those activities do not lead to procreation).
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moral or religious guilt many of its members feel for engaging in
sodomy themselves; looking for absolution of their own sins of
the bedroom by publicly denouncing such acts through laws
enacted by their legislative representatives. As therapeutic as
such laws may be, the rehabilitative effect is vastly outweighed
by the injustice they cause. A brief look at the history of these
anachronistic laws reveals how some of the modern attitudes
associated with them arose.
There are two things about sodomy to be learned from
history. First, despite belief to the contrary, homosexual sodomy
was not always the object of contempt. Second, once it did
become the object of contempt, the resulting prejudice was both
punitive and severe. The adoption of anti-sodomy law as a
secular concern was largely by accident. Sodomy did not become

a secular offense in England until

1533.127

Until that time it was

purely an ecclesiastical offense. 128 It was England's break with
the Roman Catholic Church, not any new policy by the sovereign
to criminalize or punish acts of sodomy, that caused sodomy to
129
fall under the secular jurisdiction of the English crown.
The Ancient Greeks considered homosexuality to be entirely
ordinary, 130 and homosexuals were not distinguished from
heterosexuals in the urban centers of Roman society. In both
societies, homosexual activity was regarded "as an ordinary part
of the range of human eroticism.' 31 The culture of late medieval
and early modern Italy did not separate men into categories of
Rather, the polar
homosexual and heterosexual either.
is a
and
heterosexuality
opposition ascribed to homosexuality
product of contemporary Western culture that would have
seemed foreign to Italians of the Renaissance. 132 Surprisingly,
even the early Christian Church did not oppose homosexual
behavior per se. 133 In fact, up until the twelfth century "moral
127

See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 211 n.6 (1986) (citing 25 Hen VIII,

ch. 6).

128 See id. at 211-12 n.6 (citing J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
IN ENGLAND 429-30 (1883)).
129 See id. (citing C.E. COKE, INSTITUTES, ch.10 (4th ed. 1797)).
AND
SOCIAL TOLERANCE
BOSWELL,
CHRISTIANITY,
130 See JOHN

HOMOSEXUALITY 49 (1980).
131Id. at 333.
132 See MICHAEL ROCKE, FORBIDDEN FRIENDSHIPS 10-11 (1996). Southeast
Asia and Japan were also tolerant of male homosexual activity. See also POSNER,
supra note 3, at 68-69.
133 See BOSWELL, supra note 130, at 333.
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theology was basically indifferent to homosexuality, and legal
sanctions were very rare."13 4 It was only during the latter half of
the twelfth century that literary, theological, and legal writing
began to display hostility toward homosexuals, and by the latter
half of the Middle Ages, homosexuality was increasingly
associated with heresy. 35 Some of the earliest and most severe
laws against homosexuals were enacted by the European
conquerors of Jerusalem, where the sentence for sodomy was
death by burning. 13 6 In modern times, the Nazi persecution of
homosexuals along with those of Jewish faith is the most
37
extreme manifestation of the prejudice against homosexuals
In America, homosexuals have been subject to official
harassment, denied government jobs and public benefits, and
excluded from immigration and naturalization. 3 3 It was, in fact,
persecution by police in New York City that was the catalyst of
the modern gay rights movement. In the 1960s police routinely
raided establishments frequented by gays. In 1969, a routine
139
raid of the Stonewall Inn turned into a gay riot.
The facts surrounding Wasson are particularly illustrative of
140
the lengths government has gone to in harassing homosexuals.
These facts also reveal the weakness in the argument that
sodomy laws need not be overturned because they are never
Even where sodomy statutes are not enforced
enforced.' 4 '
134

Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850, 853 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) [hereinafter

Able I].
See BOSWELL, supra note 130, at 284, 334.
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Social ConstructionistCritique of Posner's
Sex and Reason: Steps Toward a Gay Legal Agenda, 102 YALE L.J. 333, 370 (1992).
137 See Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened
Scrutiny for Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1753, 1755 (1996); see also Able I, 968 F.
Supp. at 852. In fact, one of the modern symbols adopted by the gay rights
movement-an inverted pink triangle-has its roots in the Nazi persecution of
homosexuals. A piece of pink cloth, cut in a triangle, was used to mark homosexuals
in the Nazi death camps.
138 See Able I, 968 F. Supp. at 854.
139 See id. at 854-55.
140 See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
141 See Debbie Nathan, Sodomy for the Masses, THE NATION, April 19, 1999, at
16. Just because sodomy laws are difficult to enforce does not mean they are never
enforced. Texas Police, responding to a false report of a gun-wielding maniac in the
home of John Lawrence and Tyrone Garner, which was phoned in by a vindictive
acquaintance, came upon the two men engaged in an act of sodomy. The men were
charged with a misdemeanor that carried a $500 fine. See id. at 20.
Sodomy laws are frequently enforced against homosexuals in Puerto Rico. As
recently as 1998, Puerto Rico's Justice Department warned that it "would prosecute
135
136
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against homosexuals, their mere existence is enough to wreak
142
legal havoc for homosexual men and women.
And the days of brutal violence against homosexuals are not
over. A recent National Institute of Justice study found that
homosexuals are the most frequent victims of hate crimes. 14 3 A
number of recent incidents add to the austere statistics. In 1998,
Matthew Shepard, a gay twenty-one year-old University of
Wyoming student, was tied to a fence, beaten, and left to die in
near freezing temperatures by two men aged twenty-one and
twenty-two. 144
Six months later, Billy Jack Gaither of
Sylacauga, Alabama, was brutally beaten with an ax and set on
fire. 145 In Fort Campbell, Kentucky, Private Brian Winchell of
Kansas City, Missouri was bludgeoned to death by another
soldier while he lay sleeping. 14 6 In Redding, California, Gary
1 47
Matson and Scott Mowder were shot to death in their bed.
What do all of these cases have in common? The perpetrator's
sole motivation was a hatred of homosexuals. 148
While a majority of Americans have come to believe
homosexuals deserve the same rights as heterosexuals, almost
half believe homosexuality is a sin or just wrong. The chilling
by-product of this attitude is that some feel they are entitled or

any person engaging in sodomy if enough evidence existed to support a prosecution."
AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, LESBIAN

& GAY RTS.

AND AIDS/IHIV 2000 at 51 (1999).

142 Take for instance, the case of a Mississippi gay man who was denied custody
of his thirteen year-old son, even though his ex-wife's new husband was a physically
abusive alcoholic. The trial court judge referred to the state's anti-sodomy laws in
denying custody. See Weigand v. Houghton, 730 So. 2d 581, 588-91 (Miss. 1999).
Another example of the remote effect of anti-sodomy laws is the case of Robin
Shahar who had accepted a job with the Georgia Attorney General's office only to
have the offer withdrawn. The reason for the withdrawal? Attorney General,
Michael Bowers, as in Bowers v. Hardwick, heard that Shahar and her female lover

had held a private commitment ceremony which implied that she was a felon under
Georgia anti-sodomy laws. See Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1101 (11th Cir.),
reh'g denied 120 F.3d 211 (11th Cir. 1997).

143 See Able I, 968 F. Supp. at 854.

144 See An Outburst of Hatred, NEWSDAY, October 14, 1998, at A14.
145See Frontline:Assault on Gay America: The Life and Death of Billy Jack
Gaither (visited Mar. 31, 2001) <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/

assault/billyjack/html>.
146 See Soldier Allegedly Confessed to Killing, CNN.com, Sept. 1, 1999 (visited

Mar. 31, 2001) <http://www.cnn.comfUS/9909/O1/soldier.death.Olhtml>.
147See Chuck Barney, Frontline's Look at Homophobia: Painful, But So
Important, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Feb. 15, 2000.
148 See id.
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expected to punish others for their sexual preferences. 149
Enforced, or not, sodomy laws create a climate in which
atrocities against homosexuals are committed by those who feel
that they have a government stamp of approval. This section
began by raising the question, "What's all the fuss?" Anyone
who doubts that violence against homosexuals is not a
substantial enough reason for repealing sodomy laws should
pose the very same question to the parents of Matthew Shepard.
III. THE WEAK ARGUMENTS FOR LAWS AGAINST SODOMY

Judicial invalidation of state sodomy statutes has given rise
to several arguments that are repeated by proponents of such
statutes in opposition to almost every effort to repeal or overturn
them. These arguments are either fundamentally unsound or
based on a bias that state courts cannot countenance. One of the
most obvious and emotional of these arguments is based on the
relationship between homosexual sodomy, HIV infection, and
public health. Courts in Kentucky, Montana, and Tennessee
have all considered this argument and rejected it in turn. 150
The Campbell v. Sundquist decision provides a particularly
good point of departure for a discussion of these arguments. In
Sundquist, the court enumerated five arguments raised by the
government that have become the hue and cry of anti-gay
groups. The allegedly compelling state interests in proscribing
homosexual sodomy were: (1) the discouragement of acts that
cannot lead to procreation; (2) the discouragement of citizens
from choosing a lifestyle that is stigmatized and leads to a higher
rate of depression, suicide, and drug and alcohol abuse; (3) the
discouragement of short-lived and shallow homosexual
relationships initiated for the sole purpose of sexual
gratification; (4) the promotion of the moral values of the citizens
of Tennessee; and (5) the prevention of the spread of infectious
diseases.' 51
149

See id.

150 See Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 500-01 (Ky. 1993) (rejecting

claims that AIDS is a homosexual disease); see also Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112,
123-25 (Mont. 1997) (rejecting the state's claim that statutes such as these are
necessary to protect public health by containing the spread of AIDS); Campbell v
Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250, 262-65 (Tenn. App. 1996) (rejecting the alleged state
interest in preventing the spread of infectious disease while promoting moral
values).
151 See Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d at 262.
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The court, in analyzing the state's Homosexual Acts statute,
applied strict scrutiny, and individually rejected all five of the
asserted state interests on the basis that they were either not
compelling, or the statute was not narrowly drawn to advance
these interests. 52 First, the court dismissed the government's
argument that the state had a compelling interest in
discouraging sexual conduct that could not result in
procreation. 153 Griswold v. Connecticut 5 4 established that the
state may not outlaw certain intimate sexual activities because
those activities do not or cannot lead to procreation. 55 Second,
the court plainly stated that the state's attempt to save
homosexuals from a socially unpopular lifestyle is neither a valid
nor compelling reason to infringe on a fundamental right.
Noting there is not one identifiable "homosexual lifestyle" in
which a majority of homosexuals engage, the court likewise
found the statute overly broad. 56 Third, with regard to the
asserted short life and shallowness of homosexual relationships,
the court found there was simply no evidence to support such a
broad statement. 5 7
Fourth, the court dealt with the
government's reference to the Court's assertion in Bowers that if
all laws based on notions of morality were to "be invalidated
under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy
indeed."158 Acknowledging that many of the laws of the state of
Tennessee reflect moral choices, the court recognized once "these
'moral choices' are transformed into law, they have
constitutional limits."' 59 Finally, like the Kentucky court in
Wasson and the Montana court in Gryczan v. State,160 the
152

See id. at 262-63.

153

See id. at 263.

154
155

381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
See Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d at 263.

156

Id.

157

See id.

158 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).

Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d at 264.
The government interest asserted in Gryczan was protecting the public
health from the spread of HIV. See Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 123 (Mont.
1997). Like courts before it, the Gryczan court aptly pointed out that the statute in
question was enacted almost ten years before the first case of AIDS was detected. In
addition, the statute is limited to same-gender sexual activities, while HIV is easily
spread through heterosexual activities. The statute also prohibits activities that do
not spread HIV, such as touching, caressing, and kissing. Finally, the statute was
applied equally to those not at risk of transmitting HIV, either because they are not
infected with HIV, or because they practice safe sex. See id. at 124. The Gryczan
159
160
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Sundquist'6 ' court agreed that preventing the spread of
infectious disease was a compelling state interest but found the
Act lacked the narrow tailoring required when fundamental
rights were at stake. 162 The Act prohibited all sexual contact
between people of the same gender, even if they are disease free,
practice safe sex, or engage in contact that does not spread
disease. 163 In fact, the court noted that such a statute was
actually counterproductive to the goal of preventing the spread
of infectious disease in that it would force some homosexuals,
who are infected with sexually transmitted diseases, to forego
64
treatment for fear of prosecution.
Such arguments are equally refutable under a rational basis
analysis. In Wasson, where a rational basis test was applied to
Kentucky's anti-sodomy statute, the court summarized its
rejection of such arguments by stating: "Simply because the
majority, speaking through the general assembly, finds one type
of extramarital intercourse more offensive than another, does
not provide a rational basis for criminalizing the sexual
165
preference of homosexuals."
Instead of merely arguing there is no room for homosexual
sodomy under the umbrella of privacy, some make a more

court warned that criminalizing homosexual behavior is an ineffective deterrent and
actually has a negative impact on disease prevention by causing individuals to
conceal or distort important information. See id.
161 While the court dismissed a litany of the government's proffered rational
bases for its anti-sodomy statute, it gave special attention to one. The government
argued that there was a legitimate government interest in controlling infectious
disease and that diseases such as AIDS are more readily transmitted through acts
of anal sodomy. See Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 501 (Ky. 1992). The
court, however, revealed the fallacy of such an argument by showing- (1) the statute
was not limited to acts of anal sodomy; (2) the reasoning should apply to acts of
male-female anal sodomy, but the statute was limited to only same-sex acts; (3)
AIDS is not only a male homosexual disease; and (3) the statute was enacted in
1974-eight years before AIDS was ever diagnosed. Id. at 501.
162 See Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d at 263-65.
163 See id. at 263. A further consideration is that heterosexual contact is now
the leading mode of HIV transmission in the country. Incidence of newly reported
AIDS cases is growing most rapidly among heterosexuals, increasing 500% during
the period of 1985 to 1995. During the same period, newly reported cases of AIDS
among male homosexuals declined by 20%. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES; PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE; CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION; NATIONAL CENTER FOR HIV,STD, AND TB PREVENTION, HIV/AIDS

SURVEILLANCE REPORT (1995) Vol. 7, No. 2.
164 See Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d at 263-64.
165 Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 502.
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extreme argument for the legitimacy of anti-sodomy laws by
questioning the very existence of the umbrella at all. One of the
dissenting judges in People v. Onofre prefaced his dissent with
the pronouncement that he did not believe that there was any
generalized right of privacy or personal autonomy implicit in the
Bill of Rights. 6 6 Focusing on the argument that the extension of
the right of privacy to acts that take place in the privacy of one's
home would lead to a ban on laws proscribing illegal drug use,
the dissent warned of the future argument that "freedom to
choose one's own form of sensory gratification within the confines
of one's own home is a constitutionally protected 'fundamental'
right... "167 This argument is fundamentally flawed because,
for homosexuals, sodomy is not a matter of choice, but a matter
of biological necessity. There is virtually no other way that two
homosexual men can respond to sexual urges without engaging
in some form of sodomy. While some still believe homosexuality
68
is a lifestyle choice, the bulk of the evidence proves otherwise.
'GG See People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936, 949 (N.Y. 1980) (Gabrielli, J.,
dissenting).
167 Id. (emphasis added).
168 It had long been believed that homosexuals were the result of certain
childhood influences such as overbearing mothers and missing or distant fathers. In
1981, the Kinsey institute refuted this long-held belief and concluded gender
nonconformity in homosexuals occurred so early in childhood that it must be
biological. See PANATI, supra note 4, at 129. It was not until nearly ten years later
that the first empirical proof of this biological basis was discovered. Simon LeVay of
the Salk Institute studied forty-one brains and found a portion of the hypothalamus
of homosexual men was about half the size of that in heterosexual men. LeVay
studied the interstitial nuclei of the anterior hypothalamus (INAH), a portion of the
hypothalamus that differs markedly between men and women. What LeVay
discovered was the INAH of homosexual men bore a striking structural resemblance
to the INAH of women. Months earlier, a Dutch team of researchers discovered a
similar anomaly in a small group of neurons in the hypothalamus, except that this
bundle of neurons was substantially larger in homosexual men than in heterosexual
men. See id. at 132-33. Simon LeVay, however, pointed to a potential weakness in
his own study. The brains he studied all came from AIDS victims, and thus, he
could not be sure that his observations were not the result of the disease or some
other aspect of gay life. See William H. Henry, Born Gay? TIME MAGAZINE, July 26,
1993 at 37.
Another fascinating study that seemed to indicate a biological basis for
homosexuality was carried out by a team of scientists from the National Cancer
Institute's Laboratory of Biochemistry in 1993. In a study of the families of seventysix gay men, the team observed that the incidence of male homosexuality in these
families was much higher than in the general population. In addition, this
disproportion occurred largely on the mother's side of the family. See id. at 36. In a
separate study of gay brothers, scientists discovered patches of identical genetic
material grouped around the brothers' X chromosomes. Statistically, the chance
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The fact is, people do have a choice among various legal forms of
sensory gratification. Alcohol of varying proofs and prescription
and non-prescription drugs of varying strengths, such as Xanax,
Valium, Ephedrin, and Ionamin may be legally used to alter
one's mood in the privacy of one's home. The same choice
between legal and illegal sexual conduct does not exist for
homosexuals.
The primary defining characteristic of homosexuals is who
they have sex with, and, as a result, the nature of their sexual
encounters. 169 Therefore, what sexual practices homosexuals
engage in is not merely one choice in a vast array of choices that
170
defines them as a homosexuals, it is the only choice.

that brothers would both share this genetic information and be homosexual is too
unlikely to be coincidence. See id. at 37. (Noting the brothers did not share any
other trait such as eye color, hair color, or shoe size that might also account for the
genetic similarity.) Another study of homosexual male identical twins showed that
they had a 50 percent chance of also being gay. A chance far greater than that
between fraternal twins or other siblings. See id.
The biological-behavioral distinction is important because the more
homosexuality takes on the profile of a biological condition "like sickle-cell anemia
or male pattern baldness, the less sense it makes to place it under restrictions
designed to protect children from succumbing to its allures." POSNER, supra note 3,
at 295. "Some legal scholars think that if gays can establish a genetic basis for
sexual preference, like skin color or gender, they may persuade judges that
discrimination is unconstitutional." See Henry, supra at 38. These findings may,
however, be a double-edged sword in that the identification of a "gayness gene" may
cause some to tinker with the genetic code in an effort at intra-uterine, sexual
orientation based genocide. Id. at 39.
Over the years, many "cures" for homosexuality have been suggested and
attempted, including testicular castration, electroshock therapy, and exposure of the
glands to high doses of X-ray radiation. One of the more popular cures was
lobotomy. See PANATI, supra note 4, at 195. Between 1930 and 1950, Dr. Walter J.
Freeman performed a procedure in which he first stunned homosexuals with an
electric shock to the head and then hammered an ice pick through the thin bone
above the eye socket. A minute or two of random twisting destroyed enough of the
frontal lobe to achieve the desired effect-the conversion of vibrant homosexuals
into docile, sexless zombies. Freeman believed that "[]obotomized patients ma[de]
good American citizens.. . [and that] the operation has potential for controlling
society's misfits-schizophrenics, homosexuals and radicals." Id. at 195-96. Over
19,000 of these procedures were performed. The use of this ghastly procedure is
especially disturbing when one considers that in 1974, the American Psychiatric
Association removed homosexuality from its manual of psychiatric disorders. Id. at
197.
169 This is not to suggest that there are not many other factors that identify
homosexuals as a group, including complex social and cultural factors. These factors
arise, however, from the primary distinction between heterosexuals and
homosexuals, sexual preference.
170 It is important to note that "choice" is used in this context to mean a choice
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Homosexuals do not have a wide range of choices in terms of
sexual behavior, where some would be legal and some would not.
Depending on how one defines "sex," the effect of anti-sodomy
laws is to make virtually every type of homosexual sexual
activity illegal. Unlike the person who wishes to use drugs for
sensory gratification, the homosexual has no continuum of
choices. In People v. Sheppard,17 1 the New York Court of
Appeals ruled that use of marijuana in the privacy of one's home
was not protected by the right of privacy. 172 The dissent argued
that the position of the majority in Onofre was inconsistent with
this ruling. It was, however, easy for the court to distinguish the
holding in Shepard from the position it took in Onofre. Citing
the fact that there had been no showing that private acts of
consensual sodomy were harmful to the participants, the court
stated that there exists a body of evidence that marijuana use is
indeed harmful and that the decision in Shepard was predicated
73
on this evidence.
Proponents of anti-sodomy legislation point out that while
the government may not become involved in issues of private
morality, it is a common role of the legislature to enact laws that
preserve and promote public morality. As this is true, it is
equally true that proponents have not made a convincing
argument that demonstrates how governmental interference in
the most intimate of matters advances the cause of public
morality. 174 Foreshadowing the rationale that would form the
basis of the Romer v. EvanS175 decision, the New York court in
Onofre warned that feelings of distaste, even by a majority, are
no substitute for a valid and rational basis for such extreme
176
intrusion into the private lives of Americans.

between an array of same-sex practices, not a choice between homosexuality and
heterosexuality. The inability to choose one's sexual orientation is discussed supra
note 168.
171 409 N.E.2d 840 (N.Y. 1981).
172 Id. at 366.
173 See People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936, 938 (N.Y. 1980). Onofre was decided
years before the AIDS epidemic began to wreak havoc on the gay community. See
generally supranote 21.
174 See id.
175 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
176 See Onofre, 415 N.E.2d at 938.
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IV. THE PROBLEM WITH PRIVACY
An analysis of the cases dealing with the constitutionality of
sodomy laws reveals the chameleon-like nature of the right of
privacy. Some state courts define this right in direct opposition
to the Supreme Court's position. Furthermore, this right has
been expressed as everything from a relatively conservative
impediment on police power, 177 to an absolute proscription on
governmental involvement in the sex lives of its citizens. 7 8 It is
well established that the right of privacy is a product of judicial
fiat, and as a result, its definition will vary in different courts
and different jurisdictions. Despite the Supreme Court's claim to
the contrary, every time a court is called upon to apply this right,
the court is in some sense acting as a super-legislature. As a
result, privacy cannot be the proper basis for determining the
constitutionality of a fundamentally important practice by a
highly despised minority. Homosexuals will never have their
sexual freedom fairly determined if courts charged with applying
the right of privacy to the statutes that impede such freedom
recast the right with every change of the judiciary and public
opinion.
Faced with the prospect of having to apply strict scrutiny
analysis to all future issues of homosexual discrimination, it was
easy for the Supreme Court to put an end to the expansion of
privacy rights at the critical moment in the gay rights movement
presented by Bowers. Because there is no textual basis for the
right of privacy in the Constitution, the Court could not be
second-guessed in suddenly discovering the terminus of this
right. The Court, in effect, adopted Justice Stewart's syllogism
by saying, "we don't know what the right to privacy is, but we'll
know it when we see it." 179 Such soft-edged reasoning is the
perfect weapon against despised minorities in that it can
effectively be used to perpetuate discrimination against them
without leaving the smoking gun of a clearly erroneous judicial
decision.
The nebulous jurisprudential right of privacy is, however, a
177

See Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 25 (Ga. 1998).

178 See id. at 22.
179 In Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring), Justice
Stewart said of his ability to arrive at a definition of obscenity: "[Plerhaps I could
never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion

picture involved in this case is not that." Id. at 197.
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double-edged sword. As was later observed by Justice Powell, 8 0
the dissenters in Bowers were able to use the very same privacy
jurisprudence to make an even more compelling argument for
extending the right of privacy to include homosexual sodomy.
The dissenters identified two distinct, but complementary, lines
in the development of the right of privacy.' 8 ' First, there is a
privacy interest that accrues with reference to certain decisions
that are entirely up to an individual, without governmental or
societal input, 182 and second, a privacy interest is innate to
certain places without regard to the particular activity carried
out in that place. 8 3 The Bowers case pivots on both of these
184
distinct strands of the concept of constitutional privacy.
Because of the broad territory that these strands cover, it is
virtually impossible for a court to draw any bright line around
the boundaries of the right of privacy. What is left behind is a
test that is not a test, and a right that waxes and wanes with the
political environment of the times.
The Warren Court invented the right of privacy. 8 5 Under
the Rehnquist Court, this right became the basis of "a judicial
power to dictate moral codes of sexual conduct for the entire
nation."18 6 The Bowers Court acknowledged that the right of
privacy has no textual support in the Constitution, 8 7 but paid
considerable attention to assure us that the application of such a
right is much more than the imposition of the Justices' own
values on the states and the federal government. 8 8 Despite its
assertion that the Court was not acting as some superlegislature in defining this right, there is little in the Bowers
decision to support this position. Stating in the extreme his
objection to the judicial fiat inherent in the right of privacy,
180 See Agneshwar, supra note 23, at 3.
181 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 203-04 (1986) (Blackmun, J.,

dissenting).
182 See id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); see also Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
183 See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984); Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980).
184 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 204.
185 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 110 (1990) (discussing the
development of the right of privacy by subsequent courts).
186 Id. (explaining that the Supreme Court seemed to assert that society had
little interest in such matters).
187 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
188 See id.; see also BORK, supra note 185, at 118.
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Robert Bork wrote: "When constitutional law is judge-made and
not rooted in the text or structure of the Constitution, it does not
approach illegitimacy, it is illegitimate ....-"19
This illegitimacy is illustrated by the Court's reliance on
Palko v. Connecticut,190 in stating that fundamental liberties are
those "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"191 and Moore v.
East Cleveland,192 in stating that these fundamental freedoms
are those that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition."1 93 Such rarefied statements reveal the vaporous
nature of the Court's privacy jurisprudence. 1 94 In contrast to the
Bill of Rights, which, at the very least, provides a starting point
for the individual rights it defines, e.g., freedom of speech,
freedom to bear arms, etc., the phrases relied on to define the
right of privacy specify no particular freedom, "but merely assure
us... that they, the judges, will know what freedoms are
required when the time comes." 195 The Justices' reliance on
tradition and history creates a binding authority over the Court
that has no constitutional support.
History may certainly
highlight the wisdom and mistakes of the past, but there is no
constitutional authority that requires the Court to blindly follow
history when there is no good reason to continue to do so.196
Unlike the right of privacy, equal protection has a clear
textual basis in the Constitution.
Furthermore, while the
substantive due process that gives rise to the right of privacy is
often accused of subverting the majority's ability to enact
legislation, the same cannot be said of equal protection, which
"simply requires that the majority apply its values
evenhandedly." 197 It is for these reasons that courts faced with
189 BORK, supra note 185, at
190 302 U.S. 319, 329 (1937)

119-20.
(affirming petitioner's death sentence because the
state statute allowing the state to appeal a criminal case did not violate
"fundamental principles of liberty and justice" when done to ensure a trial free from
substantial legal error, and therefore did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment).
191 Id. at 325.
192 431 U.S. 494 (1977)

(holding unconstitutional a local ordinance preventing a
woman from having her grandchild live with her because it violated due process
protections by intruding upon family sanctity, and because the ordinance had only
"a tenuous relationship to [the] alleviation of the conditions mentioned by the city").
193 Id. at 503.
194 See BORK, supra note 185, at 118.
195 Id.
196 See id. at 119.
197 Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 720 (9th Cir. 1989)
[hereinafter Watkins 11].
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the issue of homosexual sodomy must abandon the amorphous
right of privacy and base their analysis on equal protection.
V. EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE ARGUMENT FOR SUSPECT
CLASSIFICATION
Rejecting privacy for fear that courts will assume the role of
a super-legislature, 198 advocates turn to equal protection as the
better constitutional theory under which to analyze the validity
of anti-sodomy statutes. If it is to be conceded that the right of
privacy cannot be applied such that homosexual sodomy will be
uniformly recognized as a fundamental right, then it must also
be conceded that a court will not apply strict scrutiny in its equal
protection analysis unless it is established that homosexuals are
a suspect class. Such classification would guarantee that any
equal protection analysis applied to a sodomy statute would
utilize strict scrutiny as the standard of review, regardless of
whether homosexual sodomy is considered a fundamental right.
Though the Bowers majority did not entertain the question
of an equal protection violation, the dissent addressed it in a
long footnote. 99 Pointing to Georgia's desire to prosecute only
homosexuals under its sodomy statute despite the statute's
gender-neutral terms, the dissent noted the possibility of an
equal protection violation in the form of discriminatory
enforcement. The Court previously declared such discriminatory
enforcement unconstitutional in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 200 and
determined that the state had an obligation to support a policy of
selective application of its laws on a neutral and legitimate
basis. 20 ' In a sentiment that would be echoed in Romer v.
Evans, 20 2 the Bowers dissenters argued the state must articulate
"something more substantial than a habitual dislike for, or
ignorance about, [a] disfavored group" 20 3 as justification for
198 See Powell v State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 31 (Ga. 1998).
'19 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 203 n.2 (1986) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
200 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (holding unconstitutional the exclusive
enforcement against Asian laundry owners of a facially fair San Francisco ordinance
prohibiting the operation of a laundry service in wooden buildings).
201 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 218 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
202 517 U.S. 620, 634-35 (1995) (stating that "at the very least... a
bare... desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest").
203 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 219.
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disparate treatment. Most interesting about this reference to
equal protection, is the dissent's suggestion that it would be
possible to address such a claim without reaching the
controversial question of whether homosexuals are a suspect
class. 20 4 It is in this observation that the Court tips its hand.
Avoiding the question of whether homosexuals meet the test for
a suspect, or quasi-suspect class was undoubtedly a strategic
decision on the part of the Court. The majority realized the
degree of difficulty they would have in applying the test for
suspect classification and concluding that homosexuals were not
part of such a class. Instead, the Court wanted to base the
question on the much more malleable, court-created right of
privacy. In doing so, the Court was able to forestall the
possibility of having to apply strict scrutiny analysis to all future
issues of homosexual discrimination, a proposition that would
undoubtedly become a political football and raise the ire of the
more conservative Justices.
Several state courts have performed an equal protection
analysis on their state's sodomy statute. In a concurring and
dissenting opinion in Gryczan, Chief Justice Turnage provided
an interesting perspective on the question of whether the more
effective means of attacking a sodomy statute is via privacy or
equal protection. Though agreeing with the court's overturn of
Montana's same-sex sodomy statute, Justice Turnage felt it was
unnecessary and unwise for the decision to be based on the right
of privacy. 20 5 Reasoning that equal protection was a far broader
constitutional right, the Chief Justice argued that the Montana
same-sex sodomy statute would not pass rational basis review in
an equal protection analysis. 206 Justice Turnage expressed
concern that the privacy theory espoused by the court would
invite a challenge to the state's statutes prohibiting assisted
suicide, stating "there is something in the lives of people equally
private and more important-the right to life or death."20 7
204 See id. at 203 n.2. The Bonadio court encountered this question six years
earlier, and likewise exhibited a weak stomach for the possibility of declaring
homosexuals a suspect class. Instead, the court assumed no fundamental right was
at stake and limited its equal protection analysis to rational basis review. It found,
however, that an anti-sodomy law like Georgia's could not pass rational basis
review. See Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47, 51 (Pa. 1980).
205 See Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 126 (Mont. 1997).
206 See id. at 126-27.
207 Id. at 127.
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In Onofre, when the New York Court of Appeals turned to
the question of equal protection, the court observed that section
130.38 of the New York Penal Code was facially discriminatory.
Because the statute treated married and unmarried people
differently, the government was obliged to prove a rational basis
for the differential treatment.20 8 The only rationale proffered by
the government was the protection and nature of the institution
of marriage. 20 9 The court not only found no rational relationship
between anti-sodomy laws and the protection of marriage, but it
also determined there was no relationship at all. 210 Because the
statute failed the less stringent rational basis test, the question
of whether strict scrutiny was the more appropriate level of
2 11
review became moot.
In Commonwealth v. Bonadio212 court also performed the
equal protection analysis that the Supreme Court, years later,
would decline to perform. The essence of the equal protection
analysis by the court was simple and brief, but to the point; the
state may treat different classes of people in different ways, but
such classifications may not be arbitrary and must be rationally
related to a legitimate state interest. Because the Pennsylvania
anti-sodomy statute made certain sexual conduct between
unmarried couples illegal that was otherwise legal between
married couples, the state created a class based on marital
status, which, under the statute, would be treated differently.
The court correctly found, however, that the "marital status of
bear[s]
no rational
voluntarily participating adults...
relationship to whether a sexual act should be legal or
criminal."2 1 3
Despite the above examples, it is difficult to prevail in a
challenge to a statute when a court is merely applying rational
basis review. Such a lenient standard gives a court considerable
latitude, and this latitude can often be used to disguise moral
opinions as judicial decisions. Designating a group a suspect
class becomes necessary when that group is "saddled with
disabilities, or subjected to a history of purposeful unequal
208 See
209 See
210 See
211 See
212 See

People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936, 943 (N.Y. 1980).
id.
id.

id. n.6.
Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47, 51 (Pa. 1980) (citing Moyer v.

Phillips, 341 A.2d 441, 443 (Pa. 1975)).
213 Id.
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treatment,
or relegated
to
a position
of political
powerlessness." 214
For this reason, homosexuals must be
granted suspect class status.
Such status would protect
homosexuals from discrimination in the face of anti-sodomy
statutes without having to rely on a court to first determine that
homosexual sodomy falls into the category of a fundamental
right. It likewise holds the court to a level of analysis not easily
subverted by religious or moral bias.
Suits against the military for denial of re-enlistment
because a service member's homosexuality became the
background against which several district courts considered the
question of applying suspect or quasi-suspect classification to
homosexuals. 215
A.

High Tech Gays
For a short time, at least in the Ninth Circuit, homosexuals
were considered a suspect class. In High Tech Gays v. Defense
Industrial Security Clearance Office, 216 a Ninth Circuit district
court held "gay people are a 'quasi-suspect class' entitled to
heightened scrutiny."2 17 The issue in High Tech was whether the
Department of Defense practice of refusing to grant homosexuals
secret and top secret security clearances violated their equal
protection rights. 218 The Department of Defense guidelines
classified homosexuality as deviant sexual conduct, placing it in
219
the same category as bestiality, necrophilia, and pedophilia.
First, the court established that Bowers had no bearing on the
220
question of whether homosexuals constitute a suspect class.

Able I, 968 F. Supp. 850, 862 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
See generally, Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998) [hereinafter
Able III; Able I, 968 F. Supp. 850 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus.
Security Off., 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter High Tech II]; Watkins II,
875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989); Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th
Cir. 1988) [hereinafter Watkins I]; High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Security Off., 668
F. Supp 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1987) [hereinafter High Tech 11.
216 668 F. Supp 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
217 Id. at 1368.
218 See id. at 1362-63.
219 See High Tech 1I, 895 F.2d at 568.
220 See High Tech I, 668 F. Supp at 1368-69 ("Hardwick does not address the
level of scrutiny classifications that disadvantage[d] lesbians and gay men should
receive under the equal protection clause. Hardwick holds only that under the due
process clause lesbians and gay men have no fundamental right to engage in
sodomy.") (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
214
215
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Then the court relied on the factors recited by the Supreme
Court in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.221 to

determine the proper considerations in designating a suspect
class. 222 In applying these factors to this particular case, the
High Tech court took the position that "[lesbians and gay men
have been the object of some of the deepest prejudice and hatred
in American society. Some people's hatred for gay people is so
deep that many gay people face the threat of physical violence on
American streets today."22 3 In addition, the court declared that
"[wholly unfounded, degrading stereotypes about lesbians and
gay men abound in American society."224 The court found these
attitudes toward gay people represent the "prejudice and
225
antipathy" that the Supreme Court warned of in Cleburne.
Furthermore, notions about homosexuality are so outmoded that
they are analogous to the equally outmoded notions of the
relative capabilities of the sexes, notions that lead to the
application of heightened scrutiny in cases of classification based
on gender. 226 The court further determined that the relative
political weakness of homosexuals caused them to be the
"discrete and insular minority" warned of in Carolene Products
227
Co. v. United States.

221 473 U.S. 432, 442-43 (1985) (holding mental retardation is not a quasisuspect classification calling for a more exacting standard of judicial review than is
normally accorded economic and social legislation, but applying a heightened
rational basis review and determining there was no rational basis for believing a
home for the mentally handicapped would pose any special threat to the city's
legitimate interests).
222 One of the characteristics of a suspect class is the immutability of the trait
that designates the class. A debate rages over whether homosexuality is an
immutable trait, with one court determining that it is not, but with mounting
evidence that the "cause" of homosexuality is largely biological. See High Tech II,
895 F.2d at 573. The Able court points out that "immutability is merely one of
several possible indications that a classification is likely to reflect prejudice," and
although alienage is not immutable, aliens are still considered a suspect class. Able
I, 968 F. Supp. at 863.
223 High Tech I, 668 F. Supp. at 1369.
224 High Tech I, 668 F. Supp. at 1369.
225 473 U.S. at 439.
226 See High Tech 1, 668 F. Supp. at 1369.
227 See 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). This footnote has been hailed as "the
most celebrated footnote in constitutional law." Justice Lewis Powell, Carolene
Products Revisited, 82 COLuM. L. REV. 1087, 1087 (1982) (stating footnote four of
the Carolene decision set the stage for the Court's future adoption of heightened
levels of scrutiny when "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities" were
involved).
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This application of the heightened scrutiny standard was
short-lived for homosexuals. In early 1990, the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reversed the High Tech I court, at least
with respect to granting homosexuals suspect class status.228
The High Tech II court enumerated the characteristics necessary
for granting a group suspect, or quasi-suspect class, status the
group must: (1) have suffered a history of discrimination; (2)
display obvious, immutable or distinguishing characteristics that
set them apart as a group; and (3) be a minority or otherwise
politically powerless. Without authority, the High Tech 11 court
took on the role of psychologist and social scientist and declared
homosexuals are not a suspect class, because "[hiomosexualityis

not an immutable characteristic.., it is behavioral ...."229 This
statement is inaccurate, irresponsible, and reveals a frightening
bias, because the "cause" of homosexuality is unknown. But
there is dramatic and compelling evidence suggesting it may be
biological in nature. 230 The suspect class designation enjoyed by
homosexuals under High Tech I was, therefore, eliminated by
this debatable statement.
The High Tech 1I court also made the argument that
legislatures throughout the country have passed antidiscrimination legislation favorable to homosexuals, and
therefore, homosexuals could not be viewed as politically
powerless. 231
The hollowness of this argument becomes
especially apparent in light of the subsequent passage of
Colorado's Constitutional Amendment 2232 and the successful
233
passage of an anti-homosexual statute in Cincinnati.
See High Tech II, 895 F.2d at 563.
Id. at 573 (emphasis added).
See supra note 168.
231 See High Tech 1I, 895 F.2d at 574.
232 Amendment 2 provides:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual
Orientation. Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or
departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities
or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation,
ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation,
conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the
basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any
minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of
discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects selfexecuting.
COLO. CONST., art. II,§ 30b.
233 Article XII of the City Charter of Cincinnati provides:
228
229
230
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B. Watkins I& II
In Watkins,234 a service member with a model record, who
served in the army for twenty years, was denied re-enlistment
because he was a homosexual. From the beginning of his
military service, Watkins freely and repeatedly admitted that he
was a homosexual. Despite this, he successfully re-enlisted,
received high-level security clearance, and received perfect
scores in reviews by his superiors. 235 The Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit considered the question of whether the refusal
of Watkin's re-enlistment constituted an equal protection
violation. In doing so, the court identified several factors the
Supreme Court considers in identifying a suspect class. The
factors identified were: (1) whether the group has suffered a
history of purposeful discrimination; 236 (2) whether the
disadvantaged class shares an immutable characteristic that
bears no relation to the group's ability to perform or contribute
to society; 23 7 and (3) whether the group lacks the political power
238
necessary to obtain redress from official discrimination.
The court performed an extensive analysis of these factors
with regard to homosexuals. First, the court recognized that
"homosexuals have historically been the object of pernicious and

No special class status may be granted based upon sexual orientation,
conduct, or relationships. The City of Cincinnati and its various Boards
and Commissions may not enact, adopt, enforce or administer any
ordinance, regulation, rule or policy which provides that homosexual,
lesbian, or bisexual orientation, status, conduct, or relationship
constitutes, entitles, or otherwise provides a person with the basis to have
any claim of minority or protected status, quota preference or other
preferential treatment. This provision of the City Charter shall in all
respects be self-executing. Any ordinance, regulation, rule or policy
enacted before this amendment is adopted that violates the foregoing
prohibition shall be null and void and of no force or effect.
Cincinnati, Ohio, City Charter, art. XII.
24 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988).
235

See id. at 1330-33.

See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985);
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-85 (1973).
237 See Watkins 1, 847 F.2d at 1345-46; see also Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686. The
Watkins I court identified this factor as "a cluster of factors grouped around a
central idea-whether the discrimination embodies a gross unfairness that is
sufficiently inconsistent with the ideals of equal protection to term it invidious."
Watkins I, 847 F.2d at 1345-46.
238 See, e.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441; Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
236
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sustained hostility."239 In addition, homosexuals have been
frequent victims of violence and discrimination in terms of jobs,
schools, housing, and even churches. 240 The court found the
intensity of such discrimination equal to that experienced by
other groups already treated as suspect class. 241 Second, the
court found that sexual orientation bears no relevance to a
person's ability to perform particular tasks or contribute
meaningfully to society.242 The government argued that the
"opprobrium directed toward [homosexuals] does not represent
prejudice in the pejorative sense of the word but rather
represents appropriate public disapproval of persons who engage
in immoral behavior."243
The government's argument was
simply, "[Homosexuals, like burglars, cannot form a suspect
class because they are criminals." 244 The court, however,
revealed the two fallacies of such a position.
First, the
regulation at issue in Watkins prevented re-enlistment of any
service member exhibiting homosexual orientation. The court
correctly pointed out that "homosexual orientation itself has
never been criminalized in this country."245 No more than the
mere desire to burglarize has ever been criminalized. Second,
the statute at issue in Watkins covered conduct other than
246
sodomy, such as kissing and hand-holding.
The court next addressed immutability. 247 Though the
Supreme Court has often focuses on immutability, 248 it has never
249
held that a suspect class must exhibit an immutable trait.
239 Watkins I, 847 F.2d at 1345 (quoting Rowland v. Mad River Loc. Sch.
District, 470 U.S. 1009, 1014 (1985)). Quoting Justice Brennan, the Able court
realized "homosexuals have historically been the object of pernicious and sustained

hostility... [and] members of this group are particularly powerless to pursue their
rights in the public arena." Able I, 968 F. Supp. 850, 862-63 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)

(quoting Rowland, 470 U.S. at 1014 (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of writ of
certiorari)).
240 See Watkins I, 847 F.2d at 1345.
241 See id.
242 See id. at 1346.
243

Id.

244 Id.
245 Id.
246 See id.

247 See High Tech II, 895 F.2d at 573.
248 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1981); Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
z9 In Cleburne, the Court doubted the requirement of immutability, and listed

the characteristics of a suspect class without mention of immutability. See City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41, 442 n.10 (1985).
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Though the causes of homosexuality are unknown, research
indicates that an individual has little control over his or her
sexual orientation, and, that once established, a person's sexual
250
orientation is largely impervious to change.
Regardless of the outcome of scientific research into the
question of the cause of homosexuality, the Watkins I court
urged a view of immutability that "describe[s] those traits that
are so central to a person's identity that it would be abhorrent
for government to penalize a person for refusing to change
them .. ."251 In an elegantly simple test, the court asked
"whether heterosexuals feel capable of changing their
orientation," posing a rhetorical question as an answer to the
inquiry into the immutability of sexual orientation. 252 In other
words, if a city passed an ordinance banning all sexual activity
except same-sex activity, would heterosexuals be able to abstain
from heterosexual activity and shift the object of their desire to
253
members of the same sex?
In analyzing the third characteristic of a suspect class, the
Watkins I court focused on the fact that the social, economic, and
political pressure placed on homosexuals to conceal their sexual
orientation prevents many of them from advocating prohomosexual legislation, and contributes to their "inability to
make effective use of the political process." 254 Even when
homosexuals do manage to participate in the political process,
the prejudice towards them renders such participation largely
ineffective. 255
These barriers to political participation are
further evidenced by under-representation by openly gay
representatives in the country's legislative bodies. 256 A common
argument against this position is that homosexuals cannot be
politically powerless because several states and municipalities
2zo See Watkins I, 847 F.2d at 1347. The number of homosexuals in society is
highly debated. Alfred C. Kinsey, in his 1948 study, Sexual Behavior in the Human
Male, estimated that ten percent of the male population was homosexual. Others,
however, have interpreted the Kinsey results as indicating that six percent of adult
men and two percent of adult women are homosexual. See POSNER, supra note 3, at
294. As controversial as the size of the homosexual population is the so-called "born
or bred" controversy. See supra note 168.
251 Watkins I, 847 F.2d at 1347.
252 Id. (emphasis added).
253 See id.

254 Id. at 1348.
25 See id.
256 See id. at 1349.
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have
passed
laws prohibiting
discrimination
against
homosexuals. 257 The fact remains, however, that the number of
states and municipalities that have such statutes are
disproportionately small, and that no such legislation exists on
the federal level. Watkins was reheard en banc.258 While the
court reached the same result, compelling Watkins' reenlistment, they arrived at their conclusion strictly on the basis
of equitable estoppel and never reached the issue of equal
protection. 259 In a concurring opinion, however, Judge Norris,
who wrote the decision in Watkins I, reiterated his belief that
equal protection was the proper basis for evaluating the case,
260
and that homosexuals are entitled to suspect classification.
C. Able v. United States
Relying on the momentum created by the Supreme Court's
decision in Romer v. Evans,26 1 Able v. United States262 marks the
last time a federal court suggested homosexuals be designated a
suspect class. 263 Able was a challenge to the military's "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell" policy 26 4 by six homosexuals, who were members
of the Armed Forces. 265 The court began its analysis by
reviewing a host of regulations already in place, which deterred
all types of sexual conduct between service members, including
acts of sodomy. 266 The court reasoned that because of the
expansive nature of the existing regulations, there was no need
27

See, e.g., N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L

RESPONSIBILITY,

D.R. 1-102(6) (McKinney

1999).
258

See Watkins II, 875 F.2d at 699.

259 See id. at 711.
260 In fact, the concurrence

in Watkins II is almost identical to the Watkins I
decision. Compare Watkins II, 875 F.2d at 711-28, with Watkins 1, 847 F.2d at
1336-49.
261 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down a Colorado state constitutional
amendment prohibiting homosexuals from obtaining state and local protection
against discrimination as violative of the Federal Constitution's Equal Protection
Clause).
262 968 F. Supp. 850 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
263 See id. at 862-63.
264 See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1) (1994) (requiring the dismissal of any service
member who "has engaged in or solicited another to engage in a homosexual act...
[unless they can demonstrate that they do] not have a propensity or intent to
engage in homosexual acts." Id. "Homosexual act" was further defined as "any
bodily contact.., between members of the same sex for the purpose of satisfying
sexual desires" Id. § 654(f)(3) (emphasis added)).
265 See Able I, 968 F. Supp. at 851.
266 See id. at 856-57.
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to add the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy for the purpose of
deterring homosexual conduct. 267 The court observed that the
policy allowed the Armed Forces to dismiss someone who holds
hands with or kisses someone of the same sex, even if done off
base and in private, but imposed no such sanction on
heterosexuals who engage in the same activities with someone of
the opposite sex.268 This observation by the court succinctly
framed the issue as a question of equal protection. While the
court professed great deference to Congress's decisions regarding
the military, it warned that military regulations are not exempt
from the operation of the Constitution's Equal Protection
26 9
Clause.
The government offered a number of legitimate state
interests to support its basis for treating homosexuals differently
than heterosexuals. 270 These interests arguably amounted to
nothing more than pandering to the personal prejudice of
heterosexual service members against homosexuals. 27 '
In
response to the state's asserted interests, the Able court
displayed a compassionate wisdom lacking in many decisions
regarding the rights of homosexuals, when it stated: "A court
272
should ask itself what it might be like to be a homosexual."
Observing that most legislation classifies groups of people
for one purpose or another, the Able court determined that if the
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy does not affect a fundamental right
or classify on the basis of a suspect class, it need only apply
rational basis review in its equal protection analysis. 273 The
conclusion drawn by the Able court was that the "Don't Ask,
267

See id. at 857.
id.
See id.

268SSee

269
270

See id. at 858. The government claimed the Act would "foster unit cohesion,
promotes the privacy of heterosexuals, and reduce sexual tensions." Id.
271 See id. at 859. The court extensively quoted Philipsv. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420,
1436 (9th Cir. 1997), noting the desire to accommodate citizens' personal or
religious objections to homosexuality could not be a rational basis for upholding
Colorado's Amendment 2. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633-36 (1996); see also
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 421, 448 (1985) (holding the
stereotype-driven fears of a group of home owners was not a rational basis for
rejecting a zoning permit to a home for the mentally retarded); Palmore v. Sidoti,
466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (holding the desire to protect a child from racial prejudice
was not a legitimate basis for awarding custody of a child to a same-race couple over
an interracial couple).
272 Able I, 968 F. Supp. at 861.
23 See id. (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996)).
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Don't Tell" policy failed even rational basis analysis and was
therefore unconstitutional.2 7 4 The court went further and argued
homosexuals meet the criteria for a group warranting suspect
classification because they are a discrete and insular minority
faced with prejudice that "tends seriously to curtail the operation
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
275
minorities."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed the district court on finding, at least in a military
setting, the legitimate interests suggested by the government did
satisfy rational basis review. 276 The Second Circuit alluded to
the chicanery in which the Supreme Court sometimes engages in
a vain attempt to weld the lid back onto the can of worms opened
by the Court's prior expansion of suspect classes.27 7 In citing
Romer, Cleburne, and Palmore v. Sidoti,278 the Able I1 court
addressed the question of when rational basis review is not
rational basis review. 279 The court noted the rational basis test
used in these cases differed from the "traditional" rational basis
test in that the government was forced to justify its
discrimination because the Court would not simply defer to just
any legitimate interest espoused by the government. What the
Able 11 court suggested is that there is yet a fourth standard of
review applied by the Court, and that this standard hovers
somewhere between rational basis and middle tier scrutiny,
perhaps a "turbo-charged" rational basis review. It appears that
the Court dusts off this standard of review when it is faced with
a class that deserves suspect, or quasi suspect classification, but
would rather not expand the ranks of the suspect classes. The
Court, therefore, distorts its rational basis test and in so doing, it
See Able I, 968 F. Supp. at 864.
United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). In Adolph
Coors Co. v. Wallace, 570 F. Supp. 202 (N.D. Ca. 1983), Judge Williams stated,
"homosexuals attempting to form associations to represent their political and social
beliefs, free from the fatal reprisals for their sexual orientation they anticipate in
jobs or other social activities, are [the type of 'discrete and insular minority' that
meets the CaroleneProducts test for suspect classification]." Id. at 209 n.24; see also
Able 1, 968 F. Supp. at 864.
276 See Able H, 155 F.3d at 634.
277 See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984) (overturning a
Florida court's modification of a custody award on the grounds that the child's
mother was then cohabitating with a black man, whom she later married).
278 See id.
279 See Able H, 155 F.3d at 634.
274
275
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can arrive at the proper conclusion without having to live with
the long-term jurisprudential consequences of an ever expanding
category of individuals entitled to heightened levels of scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
The sexual sanctuary of the bedroom is one of the most
private places in a person's life. The average person does not
worry much about the possibility that what they do in this
sanctuary may subject them to criminal prosecution. The reality
is that the chance of such prosecution is extremely small. For
homosexuals, however, the reality is different. The small chance

of prosecution is significantly greater for same-sex couples than
for heterosexual couples. But the specter of conviction under one
of the country's sodomy laws is not the greatest evil they
present.
The very existence of these laws has been, and will continue
to be, used as a means of justifying discrimination and violence
against homosexuals. Such discrimination and violence is given
the aura of state sanction because, after all, the victims are those
that commit the "heinous act, the very mention of which is a
280
disgrace to human nature."
The country has made some giant strides in protecting
sexual liberties. Griswold, Eisenstadt, Roe, and state decisions
overturning sodomy statutes are all proof of the progress that
has been made. But the fact remains that a substantial part of
the population has entered the new millenium as criminals
because of the way they privately express the most basic of
human instincts. The right of privacy is a good idea, but its
gelatinous quality makes it a poor tool for the purpose of fairly
protecting the sexual freedoms of all people equally.
The current state of affairs is one of stark contrast. For the
first time in the Nation's history, some form of state sanctioned
same-sex union will be allowed in at least one state. Yet, at the
same time that homosexual relationships are being legitimized
through one state's official recognition, other states can, and will,
prosecute homosexuals for engaging in the physical intimacy
that is part and parcel of such unions.
Often, people hear the term gay rights and imagine some
sort of affirmative action program for homosexuals. While some
280 BLACKSTONE, supra note 30, at

*215.
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involved in this "movement" may very well have this in mind,
the bulk of the gay community has something much less
dramatic in mind, equal protection under the law.
For
homosexuals, sexual freedom between consenting adults in the
privacy of one's home is not a complex matter of Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence, but a simple matter of equality. The
United States has had a commendable history of identifying
those groups that have faced adversity in a search for equality,
and providing them with the extra protection of heightened
scrutiny of laws that discriminate against them. At times, the
identification of these groups is a slow and socially painful
process, such is the case with homosexuals. Without being
designated a suspect or quasi-suspect class, gay Americans will
continue to suffer under laws that deprive them of basic human
rights.
The moral arguments against such equality are loud and
resonant. One must then ask what sort of morality creates
victims who are tied to a fence and left to die in the cold of night.

